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FOREWORD FROM THE CHAIR
Since the Global Commission launched its first report in 
2011, a significant shift has taken place in global drug policy, 
both in terms of public discourse, scientific evidence and 
policy implementation. An increasing number of national 
or local authorities are experimenting different ways of 
regulating the cannabis market, while many more are imple-
menting alternatives to criminalizing those who use drugs. 
Furthermore, opioid substitution therapy and harm reduc-
tion interventions, including needle and syringe exchange 
programs, supervised injecting facilities and drug testing 
services, are being scaled up—albeit not enough—as 
governments recognize the need for a health- and human 
rights-centered approach. This fundamental shift is hugely 
welcome. What we are witnessing is drug policy reform in 
action.
It is, however, time to challenge more fundamentally the 
way societies view drugs and those who use them. Psycho-
active substances have accompanied humanity throughout 
its whole history. Some, such as alcohol or tobacco, are 
legally accepted in many regions of the world; others are 
recognized and prescribed as medicines, while what people 
refer to as “drugs” in the context of illicit consumption are 
prohibited by international treaties. The vast majority of 
people use all these substances in a reasonable way; there 
are some, however, who are at risk of harming their health 
and experiencing social and professional difficulties. But 
illicit drugs confront the users with much higher harms: they 
have to rely on the criminal market—whose interest is in 
making them dependent and turning the highest profit—
and risk repressive measures. This combination of criminal 
offer and criminalization is particularly cruel and degrading 
for people who became addicted to drugs and those who 
use them to self-medicate physical or mental sufferings. 
Prohibition makes societies and governments blind to the 
great variety of reasons why people use drugs either in a 
controlled or a problematic way. It contributes to the dis-
crimination and marginalization of drug users, considering 
them as undeserving of understanding and help, when they 
need treatment and social integration. Furthermore, it justi-
fies criminalizing people who cause no harm to others and 
punishing those who are suffering. Prohibition also limits 
scientific research about the possible medical utility of illicit 
substances, and builds obstacles to the prescription of pain 
relief and palliative medication. 
A punitive approach to drug control fundamentally un-
dermines the relationship between the individual and the 
State, with so many of its citizens in breach of illogical drug 
laws. Unfortunately, most governments continue to share 
the objective, enshrined in the international drug control 
treaties, of a “drug-free world” or a “world free of drug 
abuse”. This goal is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve, in 
that prohibition has had little or no impact on rates of drug 
use, with the number of consumers increasing by almost 
20 percent between 2006 and 2013 to 246 million people; 
dangerous, in that prohibition fuels mass incarceration and 
executions in contravention of international law, stokes the 
spread of blood-borne viruses, drives human rights abus-
es of those who use and supply drugs, and contributes to 
the drug-related deaths of nearly 200,000 people annually 
around the world. National governments must urgently 
liberate themselves from the constraints of this archaic and 
punitive framework. 
Yet we must define what we mean by decriminalization. Yes, 
many local and national authorities have adopted alterna-
tives to punishment, abandoning criminal sanctions against 
people who use drugs and replacing them by administrative 
Rowena Camacho, 24, incarcerated for two years on a drug charge, in 
an overcrowded cell at the Navotas Municipal jail, Manila, Philippines.
© Paula Bronstein/Getty Images
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ment and social measures. Nevertheless, these alternatives 
do not go far enough. In this report, the Commission calls 
for the removal of all punitive responses to drug possession 
and use. There is also a need to go further concerning the 
non-violent acts of those who are involved in the production 
and trade of drugs because of their economic and social 
marginalization. Alternatives to punishment, and the sup-
port of neglected communities, are the pathways to liberate 
both individuals and communities from the grip of orga-
nized crime, open new economic perspectives, and respect 
the rights and dignity of all. 
This report builds on those we have published previously. It 
highlights the damage caused through the criminalization of 
people who use drugs and explores the alternatives to this 
approach. It welcomes the moves made towards more ratio-
nal and humane policies in many countries around the world 
and shows the necessity to go further in reforming national 
and international drug control regimes. The Global Com-
mission on Drug Policy is calling not only on governments 
and the United Nations, but also on the public, to change 
their perception of drug users and rid themselves of their 
prejudices. People who use drugs have to be recognized as 
equal and responsible members of society, in their full rights 
and dignity.
As long as drugs are considered as evil, and thereby crimi-
nalized, they will remain in criminal hands. Because they are 
potentially harmful they must be regulated by responsible 
governments, who are in charge of the well-being of their 
population. Exploring models of regulated production and 
markets is necessary and these experiences have to be 
scientifically monitored and the results made available. It 
is time for States to assume their full responsibility and to 
remove drugs from the hands of organized crime. 
It is time to take control. 
Ruth Dreifuss
Former President of Switzerland  
and Minister of Home Affairs
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Every year, hundreds of millions of people around the world 
use illicit drugs. Many do so for enjoyment, some to relieve 
pain, while others use for traditional, cultural or religious 
reasons. Despite the fact that drug use is both widespread 
and non-violent, the predominant approach of governments 
around the world is to criminalize those who use and/or pos-
sess drugs. Such policies are enacted with the false hope 
that, combined with efforts targeting the production and 
supply of drugs, the drug market and use can be eliminated. 
The harms created through implementing punitive drug laws 
cannot be overstated when it comes to both their severity 
and scope. On a daily basis, human rights abuses—from 
the death penalty and extrajudicial killings, to inhuman and 
coerced drug treatment—are committed around the world 
in the name of drug control, while strict drug laws have esca-
lated public health crises in the form of HIV and hepatitis C 
epidemics. Furthermore, in a number of countries drug laws 
have caused severe prison overcrowding. These extensive 
damages wrought by a punitive approach to drugs and drug 
use fundamentally undermine the principle of human dignity 
and the rule of law, fracturing the relationship between States 
and their populations. 
In order to begin mitigating these widespread harms, go-
vernments must as a matter of urgency decriminalize the 
possession of drugs for personal use. Decriminalization is 
typically understood as the removal of a criminal record for 
drug possession for personal use offenses, with the optional 
imposition of civil penalties such as fines or administrative 
sanctions, or no penalty at all.1 Though some governments 
have already taken this approach, only a small number have 
implemented policies that have brought about positive out-
comes for people who use drugs and society as a whole. 
What’s more, these governments typically rely on penalizing 
people with civil sanctions. This approach does not go far 
enough. 
The Commission believes that for the principle of 
human dignity and the rule of law to be firmly upheld, 
there must be no penalty whatsoever imposed for low-
level possession and/or consumption offenses.2 
Beyond decriminalizing the possession of drugs for personal 
use, governments must implement alternatives to punish-
ment for many low-level actors in the drug trade, including 
those who engage in social supply, drug couriers, and culti-
vators of illicit crops. Many of these people engage in the 
trade non-violently and may do so to alleviate their severe 
socio-economic marginalization. Punishing these groups is 
unjust and only serves to heighten their vulnerability. 
Ultimately, no longer criminalizing people who use drugs and 
addressing low-level actors with proportionate responses 
should be considered as a step toward bringing illicit drug 
markets under control through sensible regulation. Only 
then can the societal destruction caused by drug prohibition 
be properly mitigated. 
Drug use is, and always has been, a reality in all of our socie-
ties. For too long governments have waged a misguided war 
against the drug market and people who use drugs, handing 
down sanctions that are disproportionate, unjust and wholly 
unnecessary. The evidence of just how harmful punitive drug 
laws are is irrefutable. Governments can no longer ignore the 
need for a new approach. 
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1950 2010s
CHINA, MALAYSIA AND IRAN
In 1948, China becomes the first country 
to implement the death penalty for 
drug-related offenses, and is followed by 
Malaysia in 1952 and Iran in 1959.
UNITED NATIONS
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 
protocol, enshrines and operationalizes 
drug prohibition in international law. 
UNITED NATIONS
The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances is adopted as a response to 
new chemical substances, widening the 
scope of the international prohibition 
regime to psychotropic drugs.
THE UNITED STATES
US President Richard Nixon declares 
the “war on drugs” in 1971. UNITED NATIONS
The 1988 United Nations 
Convention on the Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances lays out the 
provisions and punishments that 
states should adopt in their 
national legislations. The 
adoption of this convention 
marks the apogee of prohibition 
as a global response to drugs.
SWITZERLAND, GERMANY, DENMARK, 
SPAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS
In the 1980s, certain countries in Western 
Europe, faced with the negative 
consequences of criminalization, introduce 
harm reduction measures. These prove 
beneficial not only for people who use drugs, 
but for society in general. 
SAUDI ARABIA AND VIETNAM
In 1987, Saudi Arabia introduces the 
death penalty for drug-related offenses. 
Vietnam follows suit in 1999.
UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations establishes its 
International Drug Control Program 
in 1991, which becomes the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime in 1997.
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
In 1990, the United Nations General 
Assembly holds its first Special Session on 
Drug Abuse, and the second on the World 
Drug Problem in 1998. These special 
sessions serve to reinforce the prohibition-
based criminal approach to drugs, and 
culminate with countries committing to 
securing a “drug free world” by 2008.
ARGENTINA AND MEXICO 
In 2009, Argentina’s Supreme Court 
rules that criminalizing possession for 
personal use is unconstitutional. Mexico 
decriminalizes drug possession the 
same year.
PORTUGAL AND THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC
In 2001, Portugal decriminalizes the 
possession of drugs for personal use, 
making drug possession an administra-
tive offense. Eight years later, the Czech 
Republic revises its penal code and 
removes criminal penalties for the 
possession of drugs for personal use.
BOLIVIA 
In 2012, as a result of a dispute regarding 
the traditional use of the coca leaf, Bolivia 
becomes the first country to withdraw from 
the UN Single Convention. Bolivia later 
re-ratifies the Convention with a 
reservation on the coca leaf.
COLOMBIA
Colombia reintroduces its policy 
decriminalizing drug possession for 
personal use in 2012, after it had been 
suspended three years earlier.
COLORADO, WASHINGTON, 
ALASKA, OREGON, AND 
WASHINGTON D.C. (U.S.)
In 2012, Colorado and Washington 
become the first jurisdictions in the 
world to establish legally regulated 
markets for recreational cannabis use. 
In 2014, voters in Oregon and Alaska 
approve ballot initiatives to create 
legally regulated markets for cannabis, 
while the US capital, Washington D.C., 
votes to legalize cannabis possession.
GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY
In 2011, world leaders break the taboo and 
demand an end to the “war on drugs”. In 
2014, they propose five pathways for drug 
policy reform.
JAMAICA
Jamaica decriminalizes cannabis possession 
for personal use in 2015 and allows 
cannabis possession for religious purposes.
UNITED NATIONS FUNDS, 
PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES
The UN Secretary-General calls on states to 
find alternatives to criminalization. In 2015 
and 2016, the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, UNDP, WHO, and 
UNAIDS publish papers recommending the 
decriminalization of drug use and possession. 
URUGUAY
In 2013, Uruguay becomes the first country 
in the world to pass a law regulating 
cannabis for recreational use. Sales are 
expected begin toward the end of 2016.
CALIFORNIA AND CANADA
In November 2016, California and a 
number of other US states vote on 
whether or not to create a legally 
regulated market for cannabis. In 
2017, Canada will be the first G7 
country to regulate an illicit drug 
(cannabis) at the national level. 
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
In 2016, the General Assembly holds its 
third Special Session on the world drug 
problem and sees significant discontent 
between countries over appropriate ways 
to approach the drug trade and drug use. 
Several countries call for decriminalization 
and regulation, though these remain 
absent from the outcome document.  
NETHERLANDS
In 1976, the Netherlands amends 
its drug laws, which introduces the 
de facto decriminalization of 
cannabis possession and supply.
SINGAPORE
Singapore introduces the death 
penalty for drug offenses in 1975. 
CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND THE UNITED STATES
China prohibits opium imports through 
commercial treaties with the UK, France, 
Portugal and the US. In 1908, it 
commits to eliminate all domestic 
opium use within a decade.
THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM 
CONVENTION
In 1912, China, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Persia (Iran), 
Portugal, Russia, Siam (Thailand), the UK, 
and the British overseas territories 
(including British India) adopt the Hague 
Convention to control the international trade 
in opium, morphine, cocaine and heroin. 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The League of Nations establishes the 
Opium Advisory Committee, the 
forerunner to the United Nations 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT
Egypt is the first country in the world 
to prohibit a now-illicit drug, banning 
cannabis in 1884. From 1887, many 
US states begin prohibiting cocaine.
GENEVA OPIUM CONVENTIONS
From 1925-1936, the cannabis trade is 
put under international control and the 
forerunner of the International 
Narcotics Control Board, the Permanent 
Central Board, is established.
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THE FAILURE  
OF PROHIBITION
June 26, 2015. Kiev, Ukraine. on the International Day against 
Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Kiev. Activists protesting 
against police harassment of people who use drugs.  
© E.Kryzhanivskyi / Shutterstock.com
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1. PUNITIVE APPROACHES 
TO DRUGS: A FAILURE BY 
THEIR OWN MEASURE 
Drug use is, and always has been, a reality in our societies. 
Every year, hundreds of millions of people around the world 
use illicit substances3—for many it is about enjoyment, for 
some it is to relieve pain, while for others it is for traditional, 
cultural or religious reasons. Despite the widespread and 
non-violent nature of drug use, the predominant government 
response to this issue is to enact highly punitive policies that 
criminalize those who use and/or possess drugs, as well as 
other low-level actors in the drugs trade. Such policies, which 
were reinforced with the signing of the three UN drug control 
treaties (see Box 1) in the second half of the 20th century, 
are implemented with the misguided hope that drug use and 
the wider drug market can be eradicated, something that the 
evidence reveals is an impossibility. 
In 2003, an estimated 185 million people globally aged 15–64 
(4.7 percent of the world’s population) had consumed an il-
licit drug in the previous 12 months;4 by 2014, this number 
had risen 33 percent to 247 million (5.2 percent of the world’s 
population).5 The number of people who were dependent on 
drugs “increased disproportionally” from 27 million in 2013 
to 29 million in 2014.6 At the same time, the illegal cultivation 
of opium poppies increased to the highest levels on record 
in 2014, reaching almost 320,000 hectares globally,7 while co-
caine production rose 38 percent from 2013 to 2014.8 
Many factors, of course, account for increases and decreases 
in the use and production of drugs. What can be observed, 
though, is that punitive approaches have unequivocally 
failed in their goal to extinguish the market. Worse, these 
approaches have led to devastating health and social conse-
quences for people who use drugs, other actors in the drugs 
trade and wider society. On a daily basis, significant human 
rights abuses are carried out in the name of drug control, from 
the use of the death penalty9 and extrajudicial killings,10 to tor-
ture, police brutality and inhumane drug treatment programs. 
Fundamentally, repressive drug policies create far more harm 
than the drugs themselves. Thus, we need new approaches 
that uphold the principles of human dignity, the right to pri-
vacy and the rule of law, and recognize that people will always 
use drugs. In order to uphold these principles all penalties—
both criminal and civil—must be abolished for the posses-
sion of drugs for personal use. While a number of countries 
have implemented decriminalization policies, many still rely 
on penalizing the user with civil sanctions, a punishment that 
is disproportionate to the act. For low-level non-violent ac-
tors in the drug trade—particularly those motivated by eco-
nomic desperation—alternatives to punishment should be 
implemented. Only through these combined reforms can the 
extensive harms of punitive drug laws be mitigated. 
2. UNDERMINING THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy is a fundamental human right enshrined 
in most international human rights treaties, including the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights11 and the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12 
Privacy is the “cornerstone of respect for personal autonomy 
and human dignity.”13 The state is only justified in interfe-
ring in an individual’s private life if they can demonstrate that 
the interference is for a legitimate aim—such as preventing 
risk to others—is proportional, and is necessary. Penalizing 
people who possess drugs for personal use, and who cause 
no harm to others, is neither proportional nor necessary, and 
can never be a justified interference. Fundamentally, this in-
terference undermines the right to privacy, personal auto-
nomy and human dignity.14 
Several constitutional and supreme courts across the world 
have determined that laws prohibiting the possession and 
use of drugs interfere with the right to human dignity, which 
can be defined as “respect for the autonomy of the per-
son.”15 For example, in relation to the state’s refusal to grant 
a license to four people who wanted to grow cannabis for 
personal use, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that a 
system of administrative bans on the recreational consump-
tion of cannabis was unconstitutional, citing disproportio-
nate interference with the principle of human dignity, and in 
particular with the free development of the personality. 16 
Courts in Chile, Spain, Colombia and Argentina have similarly 
ruled that the private use of drugs should not be subject to any 
state sanction.17 The Chilean Supreme Court, for example, in a 
case involving cannabis cultivation, stated that the legislature 
was correct in its exemption of the personal use of drugs from 
sanction in the legislation under scrutiny. The court found that 
this was consistent with the right to autonomy, where indivi-
duals are free to put their own health at risk.18 
These judgments are indicative of an evolving legal lands-
cape, where the punishment of drug use and possession 
is seen as being in direct conflict with the principle of hu-
man dignity. It is fundamental to this principle that states 
acknowledge that the consumption of drugs-In and of itself 
an act which does not harm or put at risk the legal rights of 
others-should not be subject to interference. 
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BOX 1 – THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM AND PUNITIVE RESPONSES TO POSSESSION 
The three international conventions that control illicit drugs are:
• The United Nations (UN) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (as amended by the 1972 protocol) 
• The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 
• The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 
These conventions prohibit the use, supply, production, cultivation, importation and exportation of specific drugs 
unless for medical or scientific purposes.
The table below outlines the main provisions of the treaties as they pertain to restricting the possession of illicit 
drugs. The table also outlines where derogation from the provision is permissible. 
Treaty Obligation Derogation from Obligation 
1961 Convention – “duty not to permit the 
possession” in respect of specific drugs 
controlled under the treaty (Article 33)
Not possible, except under “le-
gal authority” (Article 33)
1961 Convention – “shall adopt measures 
as will ensure that … possession … shall be 
a punishable offense” (Article 36 (1) (a))
Subject to member states’ “constitution-
al limitations” (Article 36 paragraph 1. a)
Where those who commit an offense un-
der Article 36 are “abusers of drugs” an 
alternative to conviction/punishment 
can be applied (Article 36 (1)(b))
1971 Convention – “desirable that the Par-
ties do not permit the possession of sub-
stances” in respect of specific drugs con-
trolled under the treaty (Article 5 (3)) 
Except under “legal authority” (Article 5 (3))
1971 Convention – “each Party shall treat as a 
punishable offense … any action contrary to a law 
or regulation adopted in pursuance of its obli-
gation under this Convention” (Article 22 (1) (a))
Subject to member states’ “constitu-
tional limitations” (Article 22 (1) (a))
Where those who commit an offense un-
der Article 22 are “abusers of drugs” an 
alternative to conviction/punishment 
can be applied (Article 22 (1) (b))
1988 Convention – “each Party shall adopt 
such measures as may be necessary to esta-
blish as a criminal offense under its domestic 
law … the possession, purchase or cultivation 
of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances 
for personal consumption” (Article 3 (2)) 
“Subject to its [the party’s] constitu-
tional principles and the basic concept 
of its legal system” (Article 3 (2))
Can provide an “alternative to convic-
tion or punishment” (Article 3 (4)(d))
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3. UNDERMINING THE 
RULE OF LAW 
The rule of law requires that “citizens … respect and comply 
with legal norms, even if they disagree.”19 Such compliance 
is clearly absent when it concerns punitive laws controlling 
drug use, as evidenced by the hundreds of millions of people 
who use drugs every year.20 Drug use crosses gender, race, 
class, and profession, with a significant portion of society re-
garding it as a normal leisure activity.21 The risk of imprison-
ment or receiving a criminal record does little to stop them 
from committing this offense, one which essentially causes 
no harm to others. Thus, the punishment of drug possession 
and/or use can be seen as bringing the law into disrepute. It 
is hard to think of another offense which causes no direct and 
immediate harm to others and attracts such serious penal-
ties, while being so frequently breached. 
Guaranteeing the rule of law needs to be viewed 
as a concept wider than mere coercion; it also 
encompasses inclusive access to justice delivered 
fairly, in full respect of human rights, through a 
robust system that places authority in the hands of 
relevant institutions, with appropriate safeguards.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2016)27
The widespread and persistent disregard for drug laws fur-
ther calls into question the legitimacy of state actors such as 
the police. This is particularly the case when drug laws are 
overwhelmingly enforced against a narrow sub-section of so-
ciety, and penalties fall most heavily on the poor22 and those 
from minority communities.23 Such inequitable application 
fundamentally undermines the basic principles of the rule of 
law—that all in society are equally subject to the law, and that 
its application is consistent, fair and impartial24—and severely 
weakens the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Beyond the inequitable application of the law, the growing 
body of evidence that shows no significant increase in drug 
use in countries that have adopted non-punitive responses 
to drug use,25 as well the increasing support for decrimina-
lization from several UN bodies and regional multi-lateral 
agencies,26 all call into question the rationale for pursuing 
harsh drug laws.
Any weakening of respect for institutional legal structures 
and the rule of law more generally has the potential to in-
crease the risk of corruption, and vice versa. The decision 
by states to pursue punitive policies has been an expensive 
and willful abdication of responsibility, allowing an illicit drug 
market worth in excess of US$320 billion a year to become 
inherently violent as gangs and organized criminal groups vie 
for control.28 The sheer scale of financial resources which the 
trade hands to criminal groups provides them with the power 
to corrupt state officials, from the police right up to the judi-
ciary and politicians.29 Indeed, the power of criminal organi-
zations to infiltrate and corrupt state institutions and under-
mine the rule of law is well documented, from the endemic 
corruption of law enforcement and other officials in Mexico30, 
to drug traffickers financing presidential campaigns in Gui-
nea-Bissau.31 
The aforementioned uneven applications of drug laws are far 
from the only manner in which states themselves undermine 
the rule of law. For one, the disproportionate focus by law 
enforcement on the policing of people who use drugs has 
created opportunity costs:32 by diverting resources to low-le-
vel drug activities, more serious criminal activity has been 
neglected, as will be shown later in the report. Worse, state 
actors frequently operate outside of the law in the name of 
drug control, as the barbaric actions of President Rodrigo 
Duterte of the Philippines can attest to; his call on the public 
to execute those involved in the drug trade led to the murder 
of thousands of people—many of them believed to be extra-
judicial killings—during his first few months in office in 2016.33 
Similar incidences that damage respect for the rule of law 
include: police brutality against people who use drugs;34 the 
detention of alleged drug offenders without trial,35 and the 
detention of people without due process for the purposes of 
forced “drug treatment.”36 All of these examples point to the 
widespread human rights abuses that states commit under 
the framework of punitive drug laws.
PROPORTION OF PEOPLE INCARCERATED FOR 
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4. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
COMMITTED UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL REGIME
Countries implementing their commitments under the three 
UN drug conventions often do so in violation of human 
rights. The most heinous of these violations can be seen in 
the use of the death penalty for low-level drug offenses and 
the hundreds of executions that take place annually. This is-
sue is explored in greater depth later in the report. 
Deprivation of life is not limited to cases involving the death 
penalty, though, as the killings under President Duterte in 
the Philippines show. Indeed, state-sanctioned murder of 
suspected drug users and those involved in the trade is not 
an infrequent occurrence. When Thailand launched its “war 
on drugs” in 2003, the result was the extrajudicial killing of 
almost 2,800 people, with thousands more sent to detention 
facilitates and coerced into “treatment” for drug addiction.38 
In Brazil, military police operating in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro were responsible for over 1,200 killings from 2010–
2013, many carried out in the context of the country’s “war 
on drugs.” 39 Amnesty International found strong evidence 
in one Rio favela that nine out 10 deaths at the hands of the 
police should be classed as extrajudicial executions, and 
that between 2010 and 2013, 79 percent of victims of police 
killings in Rio de Janeiro were black, and 75 percent aged 
between 15 and 29 years old.40
The escalation in law enforcement responses to drugs more 
generally contributes to heightened levels of violence.41 In 
2006, Mexico’s president, Felipe Calderón, announced a mi-
litary crackdown on drug trafficking organizations, resulting 
in an estimated 160,000 homicides between 2006 and 2014, 
many linked to cartel violence and the militarization of drug 
law enforcement. Furthermore, over 280,000 people have 
been internally displaced in Mexico42 and at least 25,000 
people have disappeared during the country’s so-called drug 
war.43 
Human rights abuses are additionally carried out under 
the guise of helping people who use drugs. The forced or 
coerced “treatment” of people who use drugs in compul-
sory detention centers—where people are detained without 
due process, the right of judicial oversight or any legal safe-
guards—is still utilized in a number of countries, particular-
ly in Southeast Asia and China. 44 Such detention breaches 
fundamental international human rights contained within the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1984 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, and undermines the right 
to health. 
These centers are associated with the serious ill-treatment of 
detainees, including depriving people of their liberty, forcing 
them into detoxification44, and submitting them to torture, 
serious sexual and physical abuse, and forced labor.46 Deten-
tion in these centers is often a result of police sweeps where 
people are drug tested and sent to the centers regardless 
of whether treatment should even be considered.47 In some 
cases they are referred there by family members and it is esti-
mated that there are 235,000 people forcibly detained in the 
Overcrowding in a California prison.
© HuffingtonPost
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region,48 a number of whom are children.49 Arbitrary deten-
tion, furthermore, is not limited to Southeast Asia and China: 
similar cruel and inhuman treatment has been documented 
in Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, India, Russia, Serbia, Sou-
th Africa, and the United States.50
Neither is the use of torture against people who use drugs 
by any means confined to these centers. A study of policing 
practices in Russia found that law enforcement used vio-
lence against people who use drugs in an attempt to extract 
confessions or information about their suppliers, with “ex-
trajudicial policing practices [instilling] fear and terror in the 
day-to-day lives of drug injectors”. 51
5. PUNITIVE DRUG LAWS AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES 
Criminalizing people who use drugs has fueled a “global 
pandemic” of HIV and hepatitis C.52 Globally, of the 16 mil-
lion people who inject drugs, approximately two-thirds are 
living with hepatitis C and at least 13 percent with HIV, with 
many at a heightened risk of contracting tuberculosis.53 In 
some countries, the rates of people who inject drugs living 
with HIV and hepatitis C are as high as 50 percent and 90 
percent respectively.54 
I have great hopes that the recent improvement of 
Iran’s ties with the international community will also 
bring progress on human rights. While recalling that 
international law prohibits use of the death penalty 
for drug offenses, I acknowledge the initiative taken 
in the Iranian parliament to at least remove the 
mandatory death penalty for some drug offences. 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, High 
Commissioner for Human Rights37
Even though the hepatitis C virus and tuberculosis can be 
cured and HIV treated, repressive drug policies, as well as 
the stigma and the marginalization of people who use drugs, 
contribute to treatment not being scaled up or reaching 
these populations. The criminalization of people who inject 
drugs pushes them toward risky injecting practices to avoid 
detection by law enforcement and acts as a barrier to acces-
sing services, including needle and syringe programs (NSP). 
Additionally, many countries deny much-needed services 
by placing unnecessary legal restrictions on the provision of 
clean injecting equipment and opioid substitution therapy 
(OST), both of which are well-evidenced interventions that 
prevent the transmission of HIV and hepatitis C.55 By doing 
so, and by disproportionately focusing resources on law en-
forcement over public health interventions, governments are 
actively undermining the health of their citizens. 
Recent trends in HIV prevalence in the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (EECA) region underscore the harm caused 
by governments in pursuing punitive drug laws. While the 
incidence of HIV infection dropped by 35 percent globally 
from 2000 to 2014, new infections increased by 30 percent 
in the EECA in the same period, driven largely by injecting 
drug use.56 Russia is a key contributor to this trend due to its 
prohibition of OST and lack of support for NSP.56 These po-
licies have led to an HIV/AIDs epidemic in the country, with 
official figures for 2014 reporting 907,000 people living with 
the virus, an increase of 7 percent over the previous year. Fif-
ty-seven percent of new cases of HIV are attributed to “un-
safe drug injection,”58 and it is estimated that by 2020 up to 3 
million people in Russia could be living with HIV.59
Beyond escalating the transmission of infectious diseases, 
the criminalization of people who use drugs and the punitive 
international drug control regime in general contribute to 
thousands of deaths and the suffering of millions each year. 
For example, the UN drug control treaties and over-reaching 
national laws have helped create a situation whereby 5.5 bil-
lion people around the world suffer from little or no access 
BOX 2 – THE APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDING 
OF A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO DRUGS
It is vital that the shift from a criminal justice 
response toward a public health one does not result 
in supplanting one repressive model with another. 
As discussed in this report a number of countries 
utilize compulsory and/or non-evidence-based 
drug treatment and claim to do so in the name of 
public health, despite such interventions actively 
undermining it. The shift has to be comprehensive, 
with policies decriminalizing possession for personal 
use offenses at the root of it. A public health 
approach must recognize the social, economic and 
environmental conditions that are often underlying 
drivers for problem drug use, and only ever result 
in the implementation of policies that are evidence-
based and do not contravene international human 
rights standards.64 Only then can the threats 
of infectious diseases to public health truly be 
mitigated.
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to adequate pain relief medication because of, among other 
reasons, restrictions placed on prescribing opiates and other 
pain medicines. This lack of access violates the international 
right to the highest attainable standard of health.60
There were over 200,000 known drug-related deaths world-
wide in 2014, with overdose fatalities accounting for between 
one third and one half of that number.61 In the US, drug-re-
lated deaths have increased 137 percent since 2000, with 
47,055 deaths recorded in 2014, 61 percent of which invol-
ved opioids.62 Fear of arrest and prosecution is one reason 
why those witnessing overdoses may be reluctant to call the 
emergency services.63
6. PUNITIVE DRUG LAWS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
PRISON OVERCROWDING
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) 2016 World Drug Report, 18 percent of the glo-
bal prison population is comprised of people convicted of 
drug crimes,65 many of them from economically marginalized 
backgrounds. The mass incarceration of drug offenders has 
led to prison overcrowding in countries across the globe, 
with such conditions highly detrimental to the health and 
well-being of inmates. 
There is ample evidence of drug laws driving overcrow-
ding. In Brazil, which in 2014 had a prison occupancy level 
of 157 percent,66 the prison population has grown exponen-
tially since the turn of the 21st century after changes in the 
country’s drug laws led to a 62 percent increase in incarce-
rations for drug offenses between 2007 and 2010.67 Fears of 
increased use of methamphetamine in Thailand resulted in 
the Thai Government clamping down on users, with almost 
196,000 people arrested in 2012. 68 Thai prisons are severely 
overcrowded at 144 percent of their official capacity,69 with 70 
percent of inmates sentenced for drug offenses.70 
I think that a lot of states are taking a look to see, 
do we have proportionality in terms of how we 
are penalizing the recreational user? Do we want 
to be throwing people in jail for five, 10, 15 years if 
they’re not major drug dealers but they’re using a 
substance that’s probably not good for them but 
is probably not hurting too many other people?. 
Barack Obama, US President, in an interview 
with KMBC, Kansas City, 26 February 2015
In the US, mass incarceration driven by drug laws—including 
mandatory minimum sentences for low-level offenses—has 
had a devastating impact on communities of color. Thirteen 
percent of the US population is African-American but they 
account for nearly 40 percent of those incarcerated both at 
the state and federal levels for drug offenses. The Latino 
community, meanwhile, accounts for 17 percent of the po-
pulation but 38 percent of those in federal prison for drug 
offenses.71 
Equally devastating is the impact of criminalization on wo-
men. Prison statistics show that the percentage of women 
imprisoned for drug offenses exceeds men, and in parts of 
Latin America and Southeast Asia over 70 percent of women 
in prison have been sentenced for drug offenses, including 
possession.72 In some US states, pregnant women who use 
drugs are vulnerable to being prosecuted for fetal child 
abuse.73 The incarceration of low-level female drug offenders 
can have a profound and negative impact on the family, and 
in particular children of incarcerated parents. Furthermore, 
across the world, mothers and pregnant women who use 
drugs are fearful of seeking support, or accessing harm re-
duction or treatment services due to the risk that their child-
ren might be taken away from them.
7. DRUG LAWS AS A TOOL 
OF SOCIAL CONTROL
The harm caused by drug policing is not confined to people 
who use drugs and others engaged in the trade—they affect 
society as a whole. Drug policing is marred by high levels of 
Former drug scene of Casal Ventoso, a neighborhood of Lisbon.
© Gael Cornier, Archives Associated Press
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racial disparity in the criminal justice system and by practices 
that are wholly disproportionate to the offenses involved. 
For instance, stop-and-search practices for drugs that exist 
in many countries frequently lead to people being caught 
up in the criminal justice system, whether or not they have 
drugs on them. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, 60 percent of all po-
lice searches are for drugs,74 predominantly for “low level 
street possession.”75 In the vast majority of cases no drugs 
are found.76 Worse, black people are six times more likely to 
be stopped and searched for drugs than white people, and 
Asians twice as likely despite the fact that drug consumption 
is higher among white people.77 This kind of disparity is re-
plicated around the world, with minority and economically 
marginalized communities often targeted. 
Police practices used for detecting drug possession often 
include repeated harassment of certain communities, strip 
searches of individuals and forcible entries of homes. They 
also contribute to the breakdown of the relationship between 
communities and states, as law enforcement is viewed as 
lacking legitimacy. 
8.  THE HARMS OF RECEIVING 
A CRIMINAL RECORD 
Law enforcement-led drug control has created numerous vic-
tims worldwide, from those involved in cultivating illicit crops 
and low-level couriers, to society in general. But it is impor-
tant not to overlook the negative and sometimes less visible 
consequences that arise as a result of criminalizing people 
for drug possession. It is, after all, the offense that dominates 
criminal justice statistics globally. 
Data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Abuse (EMCDDA) for 2014 shows that of the almost 
1.4 million recorded drug offenses in European countries78 
82 percent were possession/use offenses, with the remain-
der related to trafficking.79 The figure is mirrored at a global 
level, with possession accounting for 83 percent of all drug 
offenses.80
A criminal record can have myriad negative “collateral 
consequences,” affecting a person’s employment, educa-
tion, housing and family life. 81 In the US, for example, fe-
lony convictions for drugs, which include possession of 
certain substances, can lead to: exclusion from juries; voter 
disenfranchisement in a number of states; eviction or exclu-
sion from public housing; refusal of financial aid for higher 
education; revocation or suspension of a driver’s license; 
deportation and in some cases permanent separation from 
their families of those considered “non-citizens;” exclusion 
from certain jobs, and denial of welfare.82 In the United King-
dom, research estimated that a criminal record for a canna-
bis offense could reduce lifetime earnings by 19 percent.83 
Evidence also shows that the first contact with the criminal 
justice system can lead to reoffending. Considering the scale 
of policing of drug possession offenses, it is arguable that 
this creates a gateway effect increasing rates of recidivism.84
9. ENDING THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF DRUG 
POSSESSION AND USE
The above outline of the damage that punitive drug policies 
have wrought serves as a brief snapshot of the global situa-
tion. The extensive level of harm that has been caused by 
criminalizing people who use drugs, along with other actors 
in the trade, cannot be understated. This is why states must, 
as a first step, move toward a policy model whereby no sanc-
tions—criminal or civil—are levied against people who use 
drugs. 
A number of countries have decriminalized drug posses-
sion and/or use. However, almost all rely on penalizing the 
user with civil sanctions. Thus, drug use is still unnecessarily 
deemed to be a socially unacceptable act that needs to be 
punished. The Commission advocates for a model of decri-
minalization that involves no punishment of people who use 
drugs. This must be the policy that countries strive to im-
plement when reforming their drug laws, in recognition of 
their human rights obligations, and the need to uphold the 
principles of human dignity and the rule of law.
As I have said before and I repeat here tonight: I 
believe that drugs have destroyed many lives, but 
wrong government policies have destroyed many 
more. A criminal record for a young person for 
a minor drug offence can be a far greater threat 
to their wellbeing than occasional drug use. 
Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, Chairman 
of the Kofi Annan Foundation, member of the Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, in a speech at the 68th 
World Health Assembly in Geneva, 19 May 2015
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Used needles are returned to a needle exchange point in St. 
Petersburg, Russia. © Lorena Ros / OSF
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The decriminalization of drug possession and/or use, though 
not commonplace worldwide, is not a particularly novel ap-
proach; some countries have had decriminalization policies 
in place since the 1970s, while others have never criminalized 
drug use.85 It is thought that over 30 countries have decri-
minalization in practice, though the exact number is unclear 
due to the variation in definitions used.86
While criminalizing people who possess drugs for personal 
use is a central component of many countries’ drug strate-
gies, decriminalization is in fact permitted under the interna-
tional drug control system. This can be seen most clearly in 
the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances; though requiring countries 
to criminalize possession, it is “[s]ubject to [the country’s] 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system.” Thus, countries can opt out of criminalizing posses-
sion on constitutional or human rights grounds.87
As noted earlier in the report, jurisdictions that have adopted 
non-punitive responses to drug possession and/or use have 
not experienced an increase in prevalence.88 Indeed, a 2014 
study which analyzed the drug policies of 11 countries—a 
mixture of those with a predominantly criminal justice ap-
proach and those that had adopted decriminalization—“did 
not observe any obvious relationship between the toughness 
of a country’s enforcement against drug possession and le-
vels of drug use.”89 
Over the past decade, my country, Portugal, has 
implemented innovative policies that are people-
centered, focused on health and aimed at keeping 
people alive while respecting human rights. In 
2001, Portugal decriminalized possession of drugs 
for personal use and reprioritized resources away 
from law enforcement towards public health-based 
policies of harm reduction and treatment, thus 
shifting the entire paradigm from a law enforcement, 
justice-based perspective to an issue of health. 
Jorge Sampaio, former President of Portugal, member 
of the Global Commission on Drug Policy.90
1. DECRIMINALIZATION: 
POORLY UNDERSTOOD AND 
POORLY IMPLEMENTED
Though there are numerous decriminalization policies in 
practice across the globe, very few are well devised or imple-
mented effectively. As a result, they have failed to achieve po-
sitive outcomes for people who use drugs, the state and/or 
society. For example, countries such as Mexico have policies 
where the thresholds used to distinguish possession for use 
from a supply offense are so small as to be meaningless. This 
leaves the majority of people vulnerable to being charged 
with drug dealing or trafficking and thus receiving a lengthy 
custodial sentence, despite having no involvement in those 
aspects of the drug trade.91 Even in some countries that have 
more realistic thresholds—for example, Colombia—police 
corruption ensures that many people who use drugs are still 
ensnared in the criminal justice system.92 
In other countries, notably some in Southeast Asia, the impo-
sition of alternatives to a criminal record is no guarantee that 
people who use drugs are safeguarded from the harms of a 
punitive approach. Indeed, the alternative penalties are far 
worse if they involve compulsory detention centers because 
of the human rights abuses that occur in these facilities, as 
highlighted earlier in this report.
Within this rather bleak picture exist a select few bright spots 
that demonstrate the benefits that decriminalization can 
bring when implemented well and with a concurrent invest-
ment in harm reduction interventions and treatment. These 
benefits range from improving public health and related so-
cial factors, to reducing economic costs to the state.
2. DECRIMINALIZATION AND 
IMPROVED PUBLIC HEALTH
In its 2013 report, The Drug Problem in the Americas, the 
Organization of American States noted: “decriminalization 
of drug use needs to be considered as a core element in any 
public health strategy.”96 This position is certainly evidenced 
in countries that, along with investing in public health inter-
ventions, no longer criminalize drug use and possession for 
personal use. 
Portugal is perhaps the best example in this regard. After 
decriminalizing drug possession for personal use for all illicit 
substances in 2001, people apprehended with a small quan-
tity of drugs are now referred on a voluntary basis to spe-
cialized committees—known as “dissuasion commissions” 
(CDTs)—to determine if they need assistance in addressing 
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their drug use. In 83 percent of cases proceedings are provi-
sionally suspended.97 
Since 2001, the country has experienced a number of po-
sitive health outcomes including: a reduction in drug use 
among certain vulnerable populations; increases in the num-
bers accessing treatment services;98 significant decreases in 
HIV transmission rates and new cases of AIDS among people 
who use drugs (85 percent and 91 percent respectively over a 
13-year period);99 and a significant reduction in drug-related 
deaths.100 The current president of the International Narco-
tics Control Board in 2015 described Portugal’s policy as “a 
model of best practices” in light of these achievements.101
Other jurisdictions similarly demonstrate the effectiveness of 
a non-criminal justice response to drugs coupled with invest-
ment in health services. The Czech Republic, whose decrimi-
nalization policy has been in place since the 1990s, has HIV 
rates of less than 1 percent among people who inject drugs, 
one of the lowest rates for the region.102 In Australia, sche-
mes that divert people caught in possession of drugs away 
from the criminal justice system reduced both the frequen-
cy and the harms associated with drug use, while improving 
physical and mental health.103 
Equally, the Netherlands, which decriminalized drug pos-
session in the mid-1970s, has reported lower rates of “hard-
drug” use when compared to many of its Western European 
neighbors and the US.104 It also has one the lowest rates glo-
bally of opiate-related deaths and significantly lower rates 
of injecting drug use compared to other countries in the re-
gion.105 
The impact of decriminalization alone, however, should not 
be overstated in terms of its impact on public health; it is 
only with substantial investments in harm reduction and 
treatment services that the health problems primarily asso-
ciated with problematic use can be mitigated. However, an 
environment where drug use is not criminalized can reduce 
the stigma and fear of prosecution, leading to people feeling 
more able and comfortable to call on services for support 
should they require it.
3. DECRIMINALIZATION 
AND IMPROVED SOCIAL 
OUTCOMES AND SAVINGS
The criminalization of people who use drugs undermines their 
rights and negatively impacts on their social environment. 
Decriminalization mitigates some of those harms. In Austra-
lia, the drug diversion scheme has seen those not crimina-
UGANET, Network on Law and Ethics and HIV/Aids,  
NGO based in Kampala.© Sven Torfinn / OSF
BOX 3 – DRUG COURTS: A NON-ALTERNATIVE 
TO CRIMINALIZATION
A number of countries have implemented so-called 
drug courts—most notably the US, which has over 
3,000 such courts—as a way to stop incarcerating 
low-level drug offenders by diverting them into 
court-supervised treatment programs. While 
seemingly a more compassionate approach, drug 
courts are deeply flawed. 
In the US, for example, many drug courts issue 
disposals that require a reduction in the use of 
opioid substitution therapy (OST) in order to 
participate in court-supervised treatment programs. 
These programs often actively deny OST despite its 
well-evidenced effectiveness in helping those with 
opioid dependence issues.93 If someone relapses 
and tests positive for drugs during the treatment 
program, they may be threatened with the prospect 
of a criminal record and even incarceration, despite 
the chronic relapsing nature of drug dependence.94
The Commission reiterates its position in previous 
reports that drug courts are a conceptually flawed 
and insufficient approach.95 Drug treatment should 
be a matter for health professionals working in the 
health sector and should never involve the criminal 
justice system. Coercing people into treatment 
through the threat of a criminal sanction is wholly 
unethical and counterproductive. It is concerning 
that drug courts are becoming increasingly common 
in the Caribbean and Latin America as the US, 
through the Organization of American States, impels 
this extremely controversial initiative
21
The benefits of well-implemented decriminalization
lized for drugs suffering less adverse employment outcomes 
and experiencing better relations with their partners.106 This 
finding is supported by additional research, which found that 
those criminalized suffered greater negative consequences 
in relation to their employment, relationships and housing, 
than those who received a civil penalty for possession.107 
Portugal, meanwhile, saved 18 percent in social costs over 
the first 10 years of decriminalization. These savings were re-
lated to maintained income and productivity as a result of 
individuals avoiding imprisonment for drug possession, and 
indirect health costs such as the reduction of drug-related 
deaths and HIV rates.108 There were, furthermore, direct sa-
vings to the criminal justice system resulting from decrimi-
nalization, something a number of other jurisdictions have 
experienced.
Indeed, there is significant evidence that ending criminal 
sanctions for drug use and possession can to an extent free 
up police time, allowing them to focus on more serious crimes 
such as property and violent crimes. Portugal witnessed a de-
cline in the number of criminal drug offenses from approxi-
mately 14,000 per year in 2000 to an average of 5,000-5,500 
per year after decriminalization,109 and the number of people 
incarcerated for low-level drug offending fell from 44 percent 
of all prisoners in 1999110 to 24 percent by 2013,111 resulting in 
a substantial reduction in prison overcrowding.112
Jamaica’s reform of the law relating to cannabis 
in Jamaica represents a bold attempt to bring 
the law more in line with the conditions and 
expectations in our social context within the 
limits permissible under the international 
drug conventions to which we are party. 
Mark Golding, former Minister of Justice of 
Jamaica, at the Symposium on Experience with New 
Evolutions in Drug Policy, Oslo, 17 November 2015
Similar trends have been witnessed elsewhere. Following the 
decriminalization of cannabis possession in Jamaica in 2015, 
it was estimated that arrests for cannabis-related offenses fell 
by approximately 1,000 per month. It is predicted that there 
will be 15,000 fewer prosecutions annually, reducing the bur-
den not only on police forces but also on the criminal justice 
system as a whole.113 In the US, California saw an estimated 
$1 billion in savings to the criminal justice system in the 10 
years after it decriminalized cannabis possession in 1976,114 
while in Washington D.C., possession arrests for cannabis fell 
from 1,820 in 2014 to just 32 in 2015 after possession was 
legalized.115 
There are longer-term benefits of decriminalization, too. Po-
lice in jurisdictions that have decriminalized drug possession 
effectively have reported improved community relations as a 
result of the reform.116 Furthermore, research into cannabis 
decriminalization in Australia indicates that it can impact po-
sitively on recidivism rates,117 a significant finding in the face 
of growing evidence internationally that contact with the cri-
minal justice system is likely to result in “enhanced offending 
[rather] than diminished offending.”118 Considering the scale 
of criminalization globally, it is arguable that entire genera-
tions of young people are at risk of continued offending ini-
tiated by an arrest for drug possession, thus damaging their 
lives and placing an even greater burden on law enforcement 
and the state. 
4. BEYOND EXISTING 
MODELS: WHY DRUG USE 
AND POSSESSION SHOULD 
NOT BE PENALIZED
The Commission recognizes the positive outcomes from a 
small number of decriminalization policies. However, it is the 
Commission’s view that we need a new understanding of de-
criminalization—in order to fully roll back the damage of pu-
nitive drug laws and uphold the principles of human dignity 
and rule of law, there must be no sanctions whatsoever for 
drug possession for personal use. 
Even in cases where administrative sanctions and civil penal-
ties take the place of criminalization, those measures are still 
an unnecessary use of the state’s resources. This is particular-
ly the case in countries that may lack the institutional capacity 
to implement a regime of civil penalties, and/or ones that 
have more pressing security and law enforcement concerns. 
Consumption center, Quai 9, Geneva, Switzerland




PUNISHMENT OF  
LOW-LEVEL ACTORS  
IN THE DRUG TRADE
Bolivian farmers cultivate a coca field. © africa924 / Shutterstock.com
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While decriminalizing possession for personal use is funda-
mental, there are many other low-level and non-violent ac-
tions in the drug trade for which criminalization is both un-
necessary and wholly disproportionate. Indeed, in its 2015 
unreleased briefing paper on decriminalization, UNODC 
stated that minor drug-related offenses, “such as drug dea-
ling to maintain personal drug use or to survive in a very mar-
ginalized environment,” should receive alternative sanctions 
to punishment.119
Individuals engage in the drug market for a number of rea-
sons; some may do so due to economic marginalization and 
a lack of other opportunities, others out of coercion. Yet cri-
minal justice systems rarely take these factors into considera-
tion when prosecuting low-level actors, who are vulnerable to 
facing severe punishment, from lengthy custodial sentences 
to the death penalty in certain instances. 
Thirty-three countries retain the death penalty for drug of-
fenses, and though only some of these countries enforce 
this law, it is estimated that hundreds of people—primarily 
low-level drug couriers—are executed annually for minor 
drug offenses.120 Worryingly, in some countries there has 
been an increase in executions for drug-related offenses in 
recent years. For example, when comparing data from 2014 
to 2015, the number of executions jumped from 41 to 64 in 
Saudi Arabia and 367 to 638 in Iran.121 Similarly, after execu-
ting two drug offenders between 2007 and 2012, Indonesia 
carried out 14 such executions in 2015 and another four in 
July 2016.122 The number of people executed annually says 
nothing of the hundreds who languish on death row around 
the world for low-level drug offenses. 
The death penalty for drug offenses is a gross violation of 
international human rights law124 and must be halted imme-
diately. Similarly, other severe punishments for low-level ac-
tions in the drug trade must be rescinded. What follows is a 
necessarily brief overview of a selection of low-level actors 
who should not be criminalized for their participation in the 
drug trade. Rather, alternative measures should be utilized, 
such as fines, other administrative penalties, or the option of 
engaging in education or social reintegration programs. The 
omission of any other low-level actors here does not mean 
they should not also be candidates for alternative measures 
of punishment. 










































* States where the death penalty for drug offenses is a mandatory sanction.
†  Vietnam removed the death penalty for drug possession and appropriation in July 2016,  
 though retained it for other drug-related crimes.
†† At the time of writing, Malaysia had placed a moratorium on the death penalty for drug offenses  
 and was reportedly considering no longer having the penalty as a mandatory sanction.
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1. SOCIAL SUPPLY AND 
‘USER-DEALERS’
Governments and the media have historically portrayed 
people who deal drugs as inherently evil, pushing their dan-
gerous product onto vulnerable or curious young people.125 
This characterization not only feeds into the overarching 
aims of states to deter drug use,126 but also helps justify se-
vere custodial sentences that are handed down to those who 
engage in supplying drugs. The portrayal of dealers as pre-
datory is not only inaccurate, arising from a misunderstan-
ding of the varied interactions within the drug market, but 
also extremely unhelpful.127 
For example, research has shown that “social supply” consti-
tutes a significant portion of the lower levels of the retail 
drug market.128 In this situation, there could be a designated 
buyer among a social group who will purchase drugs and 
share them among the group for minimal, if any, financial 
gain. Even in the absence of a structured designation of a 
buyer, sharing of drugs among friends is commonplace, the 
exchanges being carried out with a view more to accruing 
social rather than financial capital.129
Within the lower levels of the market are also “user-dealers,” 
a term typically used to define those who deal in order to 
support their problematic drug use.130 Evidence from the li-
mited amount of research carried out among this group of 
people shows that many might engage in this activity in or-
der to avoid other criminal income streams, such as sex work 
or acquisitive crime.131 Indeed, user-dealing may be for those 
who use drugs problematically and are economically margi-
nalized “a practice that is perceived [as] the best choice in a 
very limited range of options.”132
The workings of drug markets are extremely complex, and it 
is for the sake of brevity here that only two examples of sup-
ply have been highlighted. What they underscore, however, 
is the need for nuance when it comes to prosecuting those 
involved in dealing drugs, which currently does not exist in 
most countries. The harsh laws that exist around the world 
against supply offenses rest on a dehumanized concept of 
the drug dealer and ignore the fact that a great deal of sup-
ply is non-predatory and non-violent.
2. DRUG COURIERS
Drug couriers are those who transport drugs that have been 
paid for by someone else. Research has shown that in some 
settings those acting as couriers typically come from vulne-
rable and marginalized parts of society.133 Though many be-
come involved in the trade voluntarily, they are often moti-
vated by poverty and economic hardship and may have little 
idea of the severe penalties they face if caught.134 Other cou-
riers have been forced into transporting drugs for someone 
else and have faced threats of violence against their loved 
ones if they try to resist.135
Once couriers have assumed their role they are typically 
powerless. Recruiters of couriers have stated that they often 
mislead those recruited when it comes to both how much 
they are going to be transporting and the drug in question.136 
This leaves the courier in an extremely vulnerable situation, 
as sentencing is determined in most countries by both the 
class of drug and the weight. The investor can, for example, 
take the risk and send the courier with a larger amount than 
agreed in the pursuit of greater profit, leaving the courier 
open to receiving a lengthy sentence if caught—or worse, 
execution in countries that retain the death penalty for drug 
offenses. In contrast, professional traffickers typically trans-
port less than couriers since they understand how the weight 
they are caught with can determine the length of prison sen-
tence ultimately handed down.137
Couriers are essentially held responsible for decisions and 
circumstances that are well outside of their own control.138 
Any claim they might make in court that they were unaware 
of the amount they were transporting or that they were 
coerced would be extremely difficult for them to prove.139 
Evidence shows, furthermore, that couriers who are convic-
ted are more often than not first-time offenders with no prior 
criminal activity.140
To criminalize people who engage in transporting drugs out 
of economic desperation is unjust, particularly when another 
individual determines the scale of their act. Criminalization in 
this context is wholly disproportionate to the low-level and 
non-violent act being carried out. 
3. CULTIVATORS AND THE 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
FORCEFUL ERADICATION
As with couriers, cultivators of crops used to produce illicit 
drugs—for example, opium poppies, coca, and to a lesser 
extent cannabis—often engage in the drug trade out of eco-
nomic necessity. Many reside in areas where basic infrastruc-
ture, access to licit markets and health services are lacking.147 
In this context the decision to grow illicit crops can be seen as 
a highly rational one; these crops offer a degree of economic 
stability, are comparatively robust and able to grow in poor 
agricultural conditions.148 Getting crops to market—particu-
25
Beyond possession: alternatives to punishment of low-level actors in the drug trade 
larly in an area with poor infrastructure—can be a non-factor 
due to the willingness of transporters to collect crops, and 
the demand for the crops is relatively reliable.149 However, 
growers’ limited range of economic options is rarely factored 
in when it comes to state responses to them; most cultivators 
are vulnerable to being criminalized like other low-level ac-
tors in the trade. 
In addition to the threat of criminalization, growers face 
having their livelihoods destroyed. The eradication of illicit 
crops has been a key component of failed supply reduc-
tion efforts for decades, enshrined as it is in the 1961 Single 
Convention, which allows cultivation of these crops only for 
scientific or medical purposes. 
Such eradication efforts have had disastrous consequences, 
not only economically for growers but also for the health 
and security of entire communities. For example, 1.2 million 
people faced starvation in Burma in the mid-2000s due to a 
ban on opium cultivation and lack of efforts to address defi-
ciencies in infrastructure and access to alternative markets.150 
In Colombia, aggressive aerial fumigation campaigns using 
glyphosate to eradicate coca cultivation—carried out as they 
were from the mid-1990s until 2015 when aerial fumigation 
was ended (though ground fumigation continues)—caused 
significant collateral damage: people’s licit crops were des-
troyed, soil fertility was damaged, and there were reports of 
skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal problems, along with 
miscarriages, all linked to spraying.151 The resulting displa-
cement of entire communities whose livelihoods were ruined 
can also not be ignored.152 
Compounding the negative effects of forceful eradication 
is its inefficacy. Even if cultivation is momentarily wiped out 
in one area it will simply emerge in another, either within or 
outside of national borders. Some countries have imple-
mented alternative development programs in order to shift 
cultivators from growing illicit crops to producing licit ones, 
and programs such as these have been increasingly incor-
porated into UN guidelines. However, alternative develop-
ment programs have by and large failed: many are poorly 
targeted—i.e., do not reach cultivators who are most margi-
nalized and reliant on illicit crops for their livelihoods—and 
fail to account for the economic motivation which cultivators 
may have for engaging in illicit markets.153 Above all, alter-
native development is an inadequate approach because it 
continues to address marginalized communities through a 
prohibitionist lens, seeing the very basis of their livelihoods 
as something that should be wiped out.
Fundamentally, the cultivation of illicit crops is not something 
that should be addressed through aggressive eradication 
and/or criminal justice measures. The criminalization of culti-
vators acts as an impediment to properly overcoming their 
economic marginalization, and including them in the design 
and implementation of much needed development measures 
for their communities.154 Effective alternatives to punishment 
of this group, such as diversion measures addressing core 
drivers for the activity, would not only mitigate the harms of 
unnecessary and disproportionate approaches toward illicit 
crop cultivation, but would also remove barriers to meaning-
ful and inclusive sustainable development. 
BOX 4 – DIVERSION SCHEMES FOR LOW-LEVEL 
OFFENDERS IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON (U.S.)
In 2011, Seattle launched the Law Enforcement 
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) pre-booking pilot 
program, a scheme that redirects low-level drug 
offenders or those engaged in sex work away from 
the criminal justice system to community-based 
services. This was the first program of its kind in the 
US, and four others have since been set up across 
the country, with several more in development or 
reaching the final stages prior to implementation.141
Those caught possessing or supplying three grams 
or less of any drug142 under Seattle’s LEAD program 
can be directed to housing, treatment or other 
services. Crucially, the program does not require 
people to abstain from drugs if they engage with 
services; rather, LEAD focuses on meeting people 
where they currently are in their lives and removes 
court-based interventions from the scenario.143
Results from the initial evaluation phase of LEAD 
have been overwhelmingly positive. Participants 
in LEAD were found to be 60 percent less likely 
to reoffend than non-participants,144 resulting in 
reduced costs to the criminal justice system.145 
Participants themselves have reported a higher 
likelihood of securing housing and licit employment 
thanks to LEAD when compared to the time prior to 
participation in the program.146 Taken as a whole, the 
evidence from Seattle’s LEAD program highlights 
just how beneficial not criminalizing low-level drug 
offenders can be, both for those involved in drug 
markets, and for society and the state in general. 
4
REGULATING  
DRUG MARKETS:  
THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP
Demonstration for the regulation of cannabis for recreational use 
in front of the Legislative Palace in Montevideo, Uruguay. The 
law passed in 2013, and sales are expected end 2016. © Pablo 
Porciuncula/Getty Images
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As the Commission stated in its 2014 report,155 decriminaliza-
tion is a vital step in the right direction for drug policy reform, 
but it is just that—a step. In order to fully mitigate the harms 
caused by ineffective and dangerous punitive responses to 
drugs, governments must ultimately regulate illicit drugs, 
from production through to distribution. 
A policy framework that decriminalizes personal use and 
possession of drugs, and implements alternatives to punish-
ment for all low-level actors, can bring positive economic, 
health and societal outcomes. It can also free up law enfor-
cement resources that can be used to tackle more serious 
violent crimes, in particular those related to organized cri-
minal groups. However, in order to undercut these groups 
further, the drug market must be regulated. Globally, it is 
estimated that the illicit drug trade constitutes the largest 
revenue stream for organized crime,156 providing them with 
the financial power to corrupt weak state institutions. 
Under a decriminalized model, furthermore, society is still 
vulnerable to the negative effects of the illegal trade, and 
people who use drugs are placed at considerable risk through 
having to navigate the uncertainties of an unregulated mar-
ket. For example, they may not know the exact composition 
of the substance they are buying or how to dose accordingly. 
It is a societal priority, therefore, that governments take 
control of this market to mitigate the harms and ensure that 
people can use drugs as safely as possible, while establishing 
age restrictions and other safety measures to govern access 
to the market. This is not a novel idea—governments already 
regulate harmful substances and there is little reason that illi-
cit drugs should be treated differently.
Drug use is very much a reality in societies around the world 
and one that governments must acknowledge. Though regu-
latory models are being implemented in certain jurisdictions 
for cannabis, it is time for governments to be bold and go 
further by responsibly regulating all drugs—not just for the 
protection of people who use drugs, but for the health and 
well-being of society as a whole. 
Certainly in New Zealand, we allowed an unregulated, 
under the radar New Psychoactive Substances 
industry to steal a march before it was brought into 
a regulated system via our Psychoactive Substances 
Act. This Act allows for NPS products to be brought to 
market if they can be proven to be low risk, essentially 
reversing the onus of proof back on to the industry. 
Peter Dunne, Minister for Internal Affairs and Associate 
Minister for Conservation and Health, New Zealand.157
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RECOMMENDATIONS
«Assist not arrest»: The Law Enforcement Assistant Diversion (LEAD) 
program aims at keeping people who use drugs for personal 
consumption and sex workers out of jail and receiving services for 
housing, counseling and job training © Ted Warren/Associated Press
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As we move toward 2019 and the 10-year review of 2009’s 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action to “counter the world 
drug problem,”158 drug control has to be aligned with the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda that was ap-
proved by UN member states in 2015. This agenda shapes 
the multilateral global framework until 2030 and is aimed at 
achieving social justice and inclusion for all.159 
The UN’s commitment to ensure that all future policies should 
operate within the sustainable development framework is 
crucial to drug policy reform. The pledge to leave no one 
behind must apply to every individual, including people who 
use drugs.160
Any agreement that member states reach in 2019 at the re-
view of the Political Declaration should be framed within the 
SDGs agenda and the pillars of the UN Charter international-
ly. This is the pathway to move away from the harms of pu-
nitive drug policies toward ones centered on justice, dignity 
and human rights for all.
States must abolish the death penalty for all drug-related offenses. 
States must end all penalties—both criminal and civil—for drug 
possession for personal use, and the cultivation of drugs for 
personal consumption. Millions of people around the world use 
drugs and do so without causing any harm to others. To criminalize 
people who use drugs is ineffective and harmful, and undermines 
the principle of human dignity and the rule of law.
States must implement alternatives to punishment, such as 
diversion away from the criminal justice system, for all low-level, 
non-violent actors in the drug trade, such as those engaging in 
social supply, drug couriers, user-dealers, and cultivators of illicit 
crops. States must recognize that a number of people engage 
in these acts out of economic marginalization and implement 
alternatives to criminalization that uphold international human 
rights standards.
UN member states must remove the penalization of drug 
possession as a treaty obligation under the international drug 
control system. 
States must eventually explore regulatory models for all illicit 
drugs and acknowledge this to be the logical next step in drug 








BRAZIL - KATIELE FISCHER
Mother of a child needing medical cannabis
Our daughter Anny suffers from CDKL5, a rare syndrome 
that brings along with it intractable epilepsy, among many 
other symptoms. When she turned four, her condition 
worsened and the medicines we had at hand no longer 
controlled her convulsions. Even when we combined 
different medications there was no effect.
It was around this time that we heard an American family 
talk about Cannabidiol (CBD) in a support group. Their 
daughter had the same syndrome as Anny and she had 
progressed since using this medication. Soon afterwards, 
a Brazilian friend called us and told us she was going to 
get some CBD to see if it would also work with her child. 
She asked if we wanted to join in and we went for it. We 
had run out of options.
At that time, Brazilian law did not consider the medical 
use of marijuana legal. Just for trying to find a solution for 
our daughter’s illness, we had suddenly entered the world 
of “drug dealing”. Until this moment, drugs, marijuana, 
drug policy, and cannabis demonstrations were not topics 
we would regularly discuss at the dinner table, like most 
Brazilians. Now we had become outlaws.
It took no more than a couple of weeks of this illegal 
treatment for us to control Anny’s seizures, all thanks to 
the medicinal effects of CBD. We grew ecstatic as we 
watched her quality of life increase – as did the whole 
family’s.
Our story became public on March 30th, 2014, when Fan-
tastico, a famous sunday-evening television staple, aired 
a report on our struggle. This was right after Customs 
retained a shipment of the illegal medication Anny was 
taking and she slipped back into the routine of intractable 
epilepsy.
We then filed an injunction and on April 3rd, 2014, Anny 
became the first person in Brazil to be legally authorized 
to import cannabis-based substances for medical use. 
Her story – along with four others - later became a movie, 
Ilegal. And that’s how, quite out of the blue, we took cen-
ter-stage in this debate.
Regulation of medical marijuana has since come a long 
way in Brazil. The federal agency responsible for autho-
rizing the medical use of substances, Anvisa, has since 
reclassified both CBD and THC, authorizing patients to 
import these medicines. Receita Federal, the Brazilian 
equivalent of the IRS, also got on board and simplified 
importation procedures. Marijuana-based medicines are 
now tax-free. On the other hand, the Federal Medical 
Council has spoken against medical marijuana. 
Presented like this, it might seem like a simple process, 
but getting to where we are now was far from easy. 
There were countless meetings, strategies, contacts and 
disagreements amongst all those involved in this effort, 
between families, Anvisa, our Drug Policy Department, 
the Drug Policy Council, Receita Federal, politicians and 
associations.
Nowadays, we are still trying to grasp the whole di-
mension of what is happening, as we take time to think 
through a lot of these issues. But we can already fully ap-
preciate the impact that decision makers in government 
have on our daily lives. 
We are a family that has to fight daily for our daughter’s 
well-being. From our point of view, we see that when the 
State creates even more paperwork or creates legislation 
to try and prevent the use of certain substances, this only 




My name is Daming, I am 35 years old. I live in Yuxi City, 
Yunnan Province. I used to live a happy life, but everything 
changed when I was 24. That year I married my girlfriend 
after a three-year romance. However, we often quarreled 
and, feeling depressed, I would go to a club to get drunk. 
I met a guy who told me that there was a type of medi-
cine that could rid me of my unhappiness. I knew it was a 
drug, but he said occasional use would do me no harm. 
I vomited the whole night after first taking it, but then I 
took it several times within a month. Gradually, I got used 
to it and stopped vomiting. I went to him every time I felt 
depressed and sank into a free world, where I felt like I 
was flying. At first he offered me free drugs, but then he 
began to charge me after I became addicted. My addic-
tion got worse and I needed more and more money. After 
spending all my savings, I began to lie to my friends and 
family. 
Over half a year later, I was caught taking drugs and held 
in custody for 15 days. My relatives and friends started 
avoiding me and I returned to taking drugs. Later my par-
ents sent me to Kunming to receive treatment as a volun-
teer addict, but I turned back to drugs for various reasons 
several days after the treatment. I was sent to a compul-
sory rehabilitation center three times by the police, where 
I spent several months or even years. My mother wept all 
day and her health became worse. The third time I was 
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sent to the compulsory rehabilitation center by the police, 
my wife filed for divorce. Consequently, my mother had 
a heart attack and passed away. Driven by the sorrow, 
my father also died the second year I was in the center. I 
was held in custody in the center and failed to fulfill my 
work tasks, so I was deprived of visitation rights. Because 
of this, I had no knowledge that my parents had died. I 
missed the chance to see them for the last time, and this 
regret will stay with me for the rest of my life.
I, along with many of my addicted friends, could not get 
away from drugs after leaving the rehabilitation center. 
Instead, we became more addicted. We met more friends 
taking drugs in the center and found more access to 
drugs after leaving. I lived a miserable and lonely life. 
I blamed myself deeply, knowing that my parents died 
because of what I did. I stayed at home alone to avoid 
seeing other people. My parents had passed away, my 
wife divorced me and I was in the rehabilitation center 
for years, all of which made me feel like an outsider in 
society, despite the fact that I was set free. I gave up on 
myself and even attempted suicide by taking drugs, but I 
woke up after a coma that lasted for a full day and night. 
After the local disease control center learned about my 
situation, they found a psychologist to help me. I took 
part in the activities they organized and later received 
methadone treatment. Now I have a job and live a stable 
life. However, I cannot bear to think about the past and 
the experience of hiding, and I fear being caught and sent 
back to the rehabilitation center. These memories often 
haunt me in my dreams.
INDONESIA - RICKY GUNAWAN
Director of Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat, Indonesia
It was around 3pm on Thursday 28 July, 2016. I was 
shocked to receive news from the prosecutor that I had to 
“prepare” for that night. It was a hint that the execution 
would take place. Indeed, when the prosecutor picked me 
up at my hotel around four hours later it was confirmed. 
We went straight to Nusa Kambangan, the so-called 
execution island where a third round of executions under 
President Joko Widodo’s administration would be carried 
out that night, and not the following night as they were 
supposed to according to the law. 
On Friday 29 July, around 3am, an ambulance came down 
from the execution site to the area carrying the body of 
my friend and client, Humphrey Ejike Jefferson (‘Jeff’). I 
had lost him after eight years of struggle. 
Jeff had been sentenced to death for a drug-related of-
fense. Not only was the judgment he received racially mo-
tivated, his execution was entirely illegal. Not only did Jeff 
have a clemency decision pending, the execution went 
ahead less than the required 72 hours after the execution 
notice was handed down. In April 2015, I had already lost 
another of my clients, Rodrigo Gularte, who had suffered 
from paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Al-
though Indonesian law prohibits sentencing people with 
mental illness, Rodrigo was sentenced to death for drug 
trafficking in February 2005. Both Jeff and Rodrigo were 
sentenced for crimes they never committed, and were vic-
tims of a senseless and failed prohibitionist drug policy. 
In the past decade I have met many other people facing 
the death penalty for drug offences. Nearly all of them 
share stories similar to Jeff and Rodrigo. There is a death 
row prisoner whose first lawyer specialized in property 
instead of criminal defense, another who was tortured to 
confess. These are poor and vulnerable people exploited 
by drug kingpins. They are deprived economically and 
politically, making them easy prey for Indonesia’s broken 
justice system and draconian, repressive drug laws.
Through decades of propaganda, the government has 
now succeeded in shaping the public perception that 
drugs are evil and must be eradicated from the country. 
“Drug-free Indonesia 2015”, was their 2014 tagline. A year 
later, the tagline changed, though, to “Indonesia: drug 
emergency situation.” Perhaps they knew they had failed 
in their impossible goal of a drug-free country. But re-
gardless of the change in tagline, the narrative continues.
And so, when the government carries out its executions 
– despite serious unfair trials and a wall of evidence show-
ing that this tactic fails to curb drug supply – the public 
continues to back this policy. What the public sees is that 
the government is trying to get rid of society’s evil. What 
the public does not see is that the government’s policy is 
making the situation worse. It is not only targeting supply, 
but also criminalizing drug use and small possession 
offenses, resulting in serious prison overcrowding. This 
policy fails to prevent overdose and drug-related deaths, 
contributing to the so-called “drug emergency situation.” 
It is a policy that stigmatizes people who use drugs, which 
only discourages the most vulnerable from accessing 
treatment. 
Ultimately, the executions that the government under-
takes are no more than a mask to cover up their failure 




MOROCCO - ABDELLATIF ADEBIBE
Chair of the Confederation of Associations of Senhaja of the Rif for Development
I´m a descendent of the Amazigh (Berber) tribe “Senhaja 
Srair”, and native of Morocco’s High Central Rif mountains, 
the historic area of kif (cannabis) culture. 
I have defended the interests of our tribe since 1999, first 
through the Association of Development of the High Cen-
tral Rif, and since 2014 as President of the Confederation of 
Associations of Senhaja of the Rif for Development (CASRD). 
My national and international efforts, in partnership with na-
tional and international organizations, are focused on the de-
fense of human rights, case studies, environmental projects, 
beekeeping, animal breeding, the transformation of canna-
bis into legal products, alternative cultures, re-forestation, 
agro-tourism, sports projects, and training programs, espe-
cially for women and young people. 
With those projects I want to combat ignorance and poverty 
among the population, and create new economic alterna-
tives in order to recover the dignity of our tribe.
Cannabis, cultivated in our region for many centuries, was 
considered a legal economy, including during the Spanish 
colonialism era, until our country’s independence. It 
was used for recreational and industrial purposes on a 
national level till Morocco signed the UN convention in 
1961. With prohibition, our tribe had no other alternative 
then to sell their harvest to hippies, and then to national 
and international drug traffickers. The change of law had 
undesirable effects on the development of our area, and 
caused a situation of repression and persecution by the 
national authorities.
A lot of innocent family members of our tribe were captured 
to create a situation of fear. No family remained unaffected. 
Two of my brothers, and other family members, were sent 
to prison without any evidence, only based on accusations. 
We didn´t have any news about them for the first 52 days of 
their disappearance. Finally we found out from a lawyer that 
they were sent for interrogation in a secret place. When the 
tribunal started we hardly recognized them as they had been 
subjected to torture. During their 18-month detention they 
were continuously interrogated in Rabat, far away from our 
region, making it very difficult for our family members to take 
care of them because of distance and waiting times for visits. 
Their five- and six-year stays in different prisons of the 
country, without any evidence, was the reason for my mo-
ther’s sadness and preoccupation, finally causing her death. I 
was obliged to give up my higher studies to take care of my 
brothers, my family and several members of our tribe.
From this time until now, the situation has hardly changed. 
The only people to benefit from this situation are the national 
and international drug traffickers. Due to the international 
demand for drugs, and the lack of development ideas for our 
region on the part of national and international authorities, 
our tribe is obliged to continue looking for solutions to their 
socio-economic problems caused by the prohibition. This 
situation has also caused social instability and an unpredic-
table future. Our population lives in fear of arrest because of 
the kif culture.
TANZANIA - HAPPY ASSAN
Tanzania Network of People Who Use Drugs
The criminalization of drugs and drug use often affects my 
outreach activities. For instance, when drug user hot spot is 
found, they all run away, making intervention impossible. At 
times we face difficulty in supporting drug users with refer-
rals or providing harm reduction kits, such as needles and 
syringes. 
Many times I have seen users test negative on HIV or Hepa-
titis but soon after police raids happen these same users test 
positive. When I ask how they think they got the disease, they 
say that when police where harassing them, they went into 
hiding, forcing them to share syringes and needles.
Another issue is that users make their money in areas such as 
bus stops and market places. They are then caught by police, 
with the excuse that they are movers who cause problems 
as they don’t have proper jobs. But I truly don’t understand 
why the police treat users like this. They are grown up people 
who can’t just stay at home. They have a life to live and needs 
to fulfill, and for that they have to ensure their livelihood, 
otherwise they will become thieves if they are stopped from 
doing such jobs.
We have a crisis response team, and many times we have to 
intervene for drug users who have been caught for no good 
reason. In only one day we can have about 20 or more calls 
from users who are in a police station or in court, and need 
our help and support so they can be released. 
Criminalization not only doesn’t help, it causes further pro-
blems. New infections of HIV, hepatitis and tuberculosis in-
crease every day. In jail cells, people are piled up and there 
is not enough space, further increasing the risk of tuberculo-
sis infection. Injecting tools are shared too as there are very 
few in there and are hidden, causing new prisoners who use 
drugs to be manipulated and bribed for sexual favors in ex-
change for injecting tools. This, of course, leads to a higher 
number of new HIV and Hepatitis infections.
The criminalization of drugs has made demand increase, lea-
ding big pushers to increase supply, providing an opportu-
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nity for new users to join in. Furthermore, there has been a 
lot of mob justice from the community just because of the 
negative impact directed against drug users.
The criminalization of drugs also means pharmacies do not 
have the freedom to sell drugs that can support drug users, 
such as buprenorphine or other similar drugs that reduce wit-
hdrawal symptoms. Criminalization forces the inevitable into 
hiding, which is not good because it can lead to a greater risk 
of long-lasting diseases.
We need to decriminalize and not criminalize drug users. We 
need support and not punish. We need tools to inject and 
need to educate about safe injection and safe sex, and not 
have people criminalized for these acts. We aren’t the pu-
shers, we only defend the users who are victims of circums-
tance.
UKRAINE - VOLODYMYR TYMOSHENKO 
Former Head of the State Service on Drugs Control
In 1992, I was working in Kyiv as an experienced 40-year-old 
security service officer in the field of combat with organized 
crime. One day my boss called me in and said: “Ukraine is 
now an independent state, we have to have a special unit 
to fight international drug trafficking. Since you have expe-
rience in fighting smuggling, drug trafficking should also be 
no problem for you.” So I had to create a whole unit from 
scratch, even though I knew nothing about drug policy or 
international drug trafficking at that time.
Since Ukraine gained its independence, the procurement of 
precursors was not controlled at all. Those for synthetic drugs 
like meth were produced at our chemical plants, smuggled 
to Europe en masse and sold there for big cash. It was first 
trafficking channel we managed to uncover and stop. Then I 
initiated amendments to the Ukrainian drug legislation to en-
force control over these substances. These were good laws, 
but all of them were written from a law enforcement point 
of view: everything must be banned and controlled. No-one 
from the Ministry of Health ever cooperated with us. 
I always looked at this situation through the eyes of the po-
lice officer, not those of a patient or of a doctor. I was de-
lighted that, after all the chaos, I managed to implement 
these controlling procedures, which we proudly reported on 
at the UN meetings of CND. We always treated a drug user 
as a criminal, at the very least as a potential criminal, never as 
a person to got into a difficult life situation. All I used to care 
about was to arrest a person, put him or her in jail, break the 
channel of drug supply. 
It was in 1995, when I became the country representative at 
UN CND, that I first heard about substitution therapy from 
doctors who claimed you can treat drug dependency with 
opioid medicines. They were experts from Switzerland and 
France. I thought, “How can one use methadone? This is like 
treating alcoholism with vodka!” I did not believe it, but rea-
lized that I had been previously ignoring the medical aspects 
of drug policy, and they are so important.
In April of 2010, on my first day as Head of Committee on 
Drug Control under the Ministry of Health, I received a phone 
call from a man who said his mother was dying and in severe 
pain. Every other day he had to travel 40 kilometers to get 
her morphine, then had to get a nurse to inject her every four 
hours. “My mother is in such pain! How can you do this to 
people!” he shouted. I answered honestly: “I don’t know…” 
I realized that I was this person who had written these laws 
that made people suffer so much. I saw that this prohibitive 
drug policy had created so many obstacles for doctors who 
couldn’t prescribe medicines to those who suffered. 
Later, when my elder brother got sick and he needed pain 
relief, he received only tramadol, which was not enough for 
him. So he called me one day and said: “Volodia, take your 
gun, come and kill me, because I can’t do it myself!” After 
that I started actively to change existing norms, finally suc-
ceeding in having the National Strategy of the State Drug 
Policy adopted in 2013, encompassing progressive and hu-
mane principles of drug policy, which Ukraine is now imple-
menting.
UNITED KINGDOM - SUZANNE SHARKEY 
Co-founder of Recovering Justice and a member of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP)
I am an ex-police officer and used to be based in the east 
end of Newcastle upon Tyne, a city in the North East of En-
gland. I joined the police service to make a difference, seek 
justice, and serve and protect the community I worked in. 
Initially I worked as a Police Constable on the streets before 
progressing to work under the Criminal Investigation De-
partment co-ordinating special operations. Later I worked as 
an undercover drugs buyer. I am also in long term recovery 
from problematic substance use, but I don’t see myself as 
someone special, different or unique. I am one of the lucky 
ones. 
My use had catastrophic consequences. I was admitted to re-
hab, relapsed, and kicked out for failing at my one chance of 
treatment. I was arrested multiple times, admitted to hospital 
on many occasions because of suicide attempts (the sense of 




Nearly eight years ago I woke up in hospital again, attached 
to monitors and tubes, not quite believing I wasn’t dead. But 
this time I made the decision to live.
What changed? How did I do it? It wasn’t the police cells and 
court appearances and criminalization that helped; the act 
of criminalization actually pushed me further out of society, 
compounded my problematic use, and alienated me. It took 
any sense of dignity I had left, my frail sense of self eroded. 
I wasn’t shown compassion or empathy. I only faced judge-
ment, further stigmatisation and marginalisation, and was 
made to feel as though I was some depraved person lacking 
moral fibre, that I just needed to pull myself together. Worse, 
a mother who could not stop using even for her children. 
It was the people I had seen in recovery who had on many oc-
casions tried to help me. They were by my hospital bed. They 
nurtured me and loved me until I could feel the same toward 
myself. What they did was treat me with dignity and respect. 
They treated me as a human being. I regained a sense of 
value, of worthiness, and was able to hold my head up again. 
The power of being treated with simple human dignity was 
fundamental to my recovery.
As I reflect on my time in the police I also feel guilt, shame 
and a sense of failure. Ashamed that I wasn’t arresting career 
criminals, locking up bad people, that I was instead arresting 
people from poor, socially deprived areas of high unemploy-
ment, people who had little or no hope. Many whose only 
crime was non-violent drug possession. The consequences 
they faced are on my conscience.
In my time I made absolutely no difference except wreck the 
lives of those who had little or no hope in the first place. I 
helped create unnecessary barriers to those wanting better 
lives and opportunities by giving them criminal convictions. 
This is the reality of the war on drugs.
I believe one of the biggest barriers to people with proble-
matic substance use seeking help and accessing treatment 
are the current drug policies. They achieve nothing except 
create more harm for individuals, families and society as a 
whole.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - SUSAN SHERMAN
Professor, Health, Behavior and Society, Johns Hopkins University
Public health is unique in that it is truly positioned at the 
intersection of social justice, human rights, and all around 
good policy. There are countless examples of how public 
health has reduced morbidity and mortality at a cost savings, 
and leveled the playing field of disparity that often charac-
terizes adverse health and illness. My own personal road to 
public health is firmly rooted in the AIDS crisis in the early 
1990s in San Francisco. After working on issues of justice sur-
rounding sexual assault during my time at college, I could 
not believe there was yet another disease that was so po-
litical yet so personal. The world of HIV opened my eyes to 
the injustice that derives from many nonresponses. And the 
great disconnect between science and political will. Over the 
past two decades, my research has focused on improving the 
health and wellbeing of drug users, which includes expan-
ding their options for employment, access to services, and 
access to healthcare. This work has taken me to many places 
around the world, but none as startling as my home in Bal-
timore, Maryland. Most recently I have been examining the 
role of the police on the HIV risk environment of both cis- and 
trans- street-based sex workers. In this context, the majority 
of cis-female sex workers have enduring drug habits, which 
often are a driver into selling street-based sex. Public health 
has failed these women – notably in our lack of effective advo-
cacy in decriminalizing sex work and low-level drug offenses. 
These women lie at the crossroads of bad policies, a lack of 
employment and enduring drug markets. They are largely 
unstably housed, have extensive heroin habits, have been in 
and out of prison on low-level drug and prostitution charges, 
and have a history of past and current sexual abuse. How is it 
that this exists in 2016 in places such as Baltimore in the US? 
How is it that their HIV rates are over 7 percent, and there are 
few programs outside of our observational and intervention 
research that focuses on them? My struggle as a researcher is 
now to create the evidence that brings light and documents 
the lives of these women, while doing all that we can do for 
them in the context of an observational study. The only way 
that I can bear witness without great guilt in not just “obser-
ving,” is knowing how much responsibility I have in making 
sure my research informs policy: just sentencing laws, decri-
minalization of low level drug offenses, diversion programs 
that are accessed in advance rather than after someone is 
already in the criminal justice system. It is my obligation to 
use my privilege to share their stories and the statistics, in de-
veloping and advocating for necessary services and policies 
that promote these women’s health, wellbeing, and future. It 
is my challenge to find a balance between working with the 
police to institute programs that hold their own accountable 
and shed light on their harmful behaviors, and staying true to 
my own sense of social justice and what is right. Public health 
research is a powerful means to create just societies, and re-
search is at the forefront of providing the evidence to create 
the necessary change to that end. 
36
REFERENCES
1 See Hughes, C. & Stevens, A. (2010), “What can we learn 
from the Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs?” British 
Journal of Criminology, 50 (6): 999–1022. Decriminalization can 
be de jure (a policy defined by law) or de facto (the de-priori-
tized policing of drug possession).
2 Some countries around the world criminalize both the con-
sumption and possession of drugs for personal use, while others 
criminalize possession only. See Al-Shazly, F. & Tinasti, K. (2016), 
“Incarceration and Mandatory treatment: Drug use and the law 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” International Journal of 
Drug Policy 31: 172–177.
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016), 
World Drug Report 2016, United Nations: Vienna, p. x.
4 UNODC (2004), World Drug Report 2004, United Nations: 
Vienna, p. 8.
5 UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, p. 1.
6  UNODC (2016), “Number of drug dependent adults up for 




cessed August 04, 2016). 
7  UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, 27.
8  Ibid., 35.
9  Gallahue, P. & Lines, R. (2015), The Death Penalty for Drug 
Offences: Global Overview 2015, International Harm Reduction 
Association: London. 
10  Human Rights Watch (2004), Not Enough Graves: The War 
on Drugs, HIV/AIDS, and Violations of Human Rights, HRW: 
New York, vol. 16, no. 8 (c), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thai-
land0704/thailand0704.pdf (accessed August 01, 2016). 
11 UN General Assembly “United Nations Declaration of Hu-
man Rights”, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: http://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 12 October 
2016].
12 UN General Assembly, “International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights” (ICCPR), 1966, Article 17.
13 Human Rights Watch (2015), Call for Submissions on the 
Issue of Drugs and Human Rights (Implementation of Resolu-
tion A/HRC/28/L.22), Submission to the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 6, http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/DrugProblem/HumanRightsWatch.pdf 
(accessed August 01, 2016). 
14 Ibid.
15 Gearty, C. (2005), Principles of Human Rights Adjudication, 
Oxford University Press: New York, 84.
16 For the full decision, see Amparo en revision 237/2014, 
http://www.smartclub.mx/uploads/8/7/2/7/8727772/ar237_smart.
pdf (accessed September 30, 2016); see also Marks, A. (2016), 
The Cannabis Club Model from Spain to Latin America: Collec-
tive Cannabis Cultivation and Consumption as constitutionally 
protected recreational activities, Queen Mary: University of Lon-
don, working paper series (forthcoming). 
17 Marks, The Cannabis Club Model. 
18 Ibid.
19 Waldron, J. (2016), “The Rule of Law.” In The Stanford En-
cyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zal-
ta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/rule-of-
law/.
20 UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, 1.
21 Parker, H., Aldridge, J. & Measham F. (1998), Illegal Leisure: 
The Normalisation of Adolescent Recreational Drug Use, Rout-
ledge: London, 154.
22 The Economist (2015), “Prosecuting Drug Offenders: A Mat-
ter of Class,” http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21672286-
those-arrested-harder-drugs-have-easier-time-matter-class (ac-
cessed June 28, 2016).
23 Eastwood, N., Shiner, M. & Bear, D. (2013), The Numbers in 
Black and White: Ethnic Disparities in the Policing and Prose-
cution of Drug offenses in England and Wales, Release & LSE: 
London.
24 Shelby, T. (2004), “Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Jus-
tice: Rawlsian Considerations,” Fordham Law Review 72 (5): 
1705.
25 Eastwood, N., Fox, E. & Rosmarin, A. (2016), A Quiet Revo-
lution: Drug Decriminalisation Across the Globe, Release: Lon-
don, 7.
26 UN General Assembly, United Nations High Commission-
er for Human Rights (2015), Study on the impact of the world 
drug problem on the enjoyment of human rights, UN: Gene-
va, A/HRC/30/65, pp. 15-16; United Nations Development Pro-
gram (2015), Addressing the Development Dimensions of Drug 
Policy, UNDP: New York, 34, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/
undp/library/HIV-AIDS/Discussion-Paper--Addressing-the-Develop-
ment-Dimensions-of-Drug-Policy.pdf (accessed August 03, 2016); 
World Health Organization (WHO) (2014-16), Consolidated 
guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for 
key populations, WHO: Geneva, 86; UNAIDS (2016), Health, Hu-
man Rights and People Who Use Drugs, UNAIDS: Geneva, 7, 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/donoharm_
37
en.pdf (accessed September 27, 2016); Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) (2013), The Drug Problem in the Americas: 
Analytical Report, OAS: General Secretariat, 103.
27 NODC, World Drug Report 2016, xxiii. 
28 The Global Commission on Drug Policy (2014), Taking Con-
trol: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, GCDP, 13, http://
www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
GCDP_2014_taking-control_EN.pdf accessed June 20, 2016).
29 Ibid.
30 Morris, S. (2012), “Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Vio-
lence in Mexico,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 18 (2): 29. 
31 West African Commission on Drugs (2014), Not Just in Tran-
sit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa, WACD, 20. 
32 International Drug Policy Consortium (2016), IDPC Drug Pol-
icy Guide 3rd Edition, IDPC:London, 91, http://idpc.net/publica-
tions/2016/03/idpc-drug-policy-guide-3rd-edition (June 29, 2016). 
33 Ali, M. & Regencia, T. (2016), “Philippines: Death toll in 
Duterte’s war on drugs,” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/interactive/2016/08/philippines-death-toll-duterte-war-
drugs-160825115400719.html (accessed September 26, 2016).
34 See for example: Human Rights Watch (2003), Abusing the 
User: Police Misconduct, Harm Reduction and HIV/AIDS in Van-
couver, HRW: New York, https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/05/06/
abusing-user/police-misconduct-harm-reduction-and-hiv/aids-van-
couver-canada; Csete, J. et al. (2016), “Public Health and inter-
national drug policy,” The Lancet Commission, The Lancet 387 
(10026): 1434, http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/
PIIS0140-6736(16)00619-X/abstract (accessed June 14, 2016). 
35 Human Rights Watch (2004), Lessons Not Learned: Human 
Rights Abuses and HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation, HRW: 
New York, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/russia0404/rus-
sia0404.pdf (accessed August 02, 2016).
36 International Drug Policy Consortium, (2016), A Public 
Health Approach to Drug Use in Asia: Principles and Practices 
for Decriminalisation, IDPC: London, 22, https://dl.dropboxus-
ercontent.com/u/64663568/library/Drug-decriminalisation-in-Asia_
ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf (accessed August 02, 2016).
37 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2016), Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Human Rights Council’s 
31st session, UN: Geneva, http://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17200&LangID=E#sthash.9Er-
MAAxg.dpuf (accessed October 03, 2016).
38 Harm Reduction International & Human Rights Watch (2008), 
Thailand’s ‘war on drugs’, HRW: New York, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs (accessed 15 June 2016). 
39 Amnesty International (2015), You killed my son: Homicides 
by military police in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Amnesty Interna-
tional, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/2068/2015/
en/ (accessed August 03, 2016). 
40 Ibid. 
41 International Centre for Science and Drug Policy (2010), 
Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence: 
Evidence from a Scientific Review, ICSDP: Vancouver, https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/michaela/pages/57/attachments/
original/1432063035/ICSDP-1_-_FINAL_(1).pdf?1432063035 (ac-
cessed August 05, 2016). 
42 Internal Displace Monitoring Center (2014), Mexico, http://
www.internal-displacement.org/americas/mexico/ (accessed Au-
gust 11, 2016).
43 Heinle K. Molzahan, C. & Shirk, D. (2015), Drug Violence in 
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014, Justice in Mexico Proj-
ect, University of San Diego: San Diego.
44 International Drug Policy Consortium (2016), A Public 
Health Approach to Drug Use in Asia: Principles and practices 
for decriminalisation, IDPC: London, 22, http://idpc.net/publica-
tions/2016/03/public-health-approach-to-drug-use-in-asia-decrimi-
nalisation (accessed June 23, 2016). 
45 Ibid.
46 Human Rights Watch (2012), Torture in the Name of Treat-
ment: Human Rights Abuses in Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and 
Lao PDR, HRW: New York, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/24/
drug-detention-centers-offer-torture-not-treatment (accessed 
June 23, 2016).
47 International Harm Reduction Development Program 
(2009), Human Rights Abuses in the Name of Drug Treatment: 




48 United Nations Development Program (2015), Addressing 
the Development Dimensions of Drug Policy, 25. 
49 Csete, J. & Pearshouse, R. (2016), Detention and Punish-
ment In the Name of Drug Treatment, Open Society Founda-
tions, 11, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
files/detention-and-punishment-name-drug-treatment-20160315.
pdf (accessed August 03, 2016).
50 Ibid., 4.
51 Sarang, A., et al. (2010), “Policing Drug Users in Russia: Risk, 
Fear, and Structural Violence, Substance Use & Misuse”; 45(6), : 
813–864, doi: 10.3109/10826081003590938. 
38
52 Global Commission on Drug Policy (2013), The Negative 
Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health: The Hidden Hep-
atitis C Epidemic, GCDP, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.
org/reports/the-negative-impact-of-the-war-on-drugs-on-public-
health-the-hidden-hepatitis-c-epidemic/ (accessed June 22, 2016).
53 Csete, J. et al. (2016), Public health and international drug 
policy, The Lancet Commissions, The Lancet 387 (10026): 1427-
1480 (2016); WHO (2014), Guidelines for the screening, care and 
treatment of persons with hepatitis C infection, WHO: Geneva. 
54 Harm Reduction International (2014), The Global State of 
Harm Reduction 2014, HRI: London (https://www.hri.global/
files/2015/02/16/GSHR2014.pdf accessed September 26, 2016).
55 See, for example, the Lancet 2010 special series on HIV in-
fection among people who inject drugs
56 Csete, J. et al. (2016), Public health and international drug 
policy, 1435 (2016).
57 Ibid, 1441. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ruehl, C., Pokrovsky, V. and Vinogradov, V. (2002), The Eco-
nomic Consequences of HIV in Russia, The World Bank Group.
60 Global Commission on Drug Policy (2015), The Negative 
Impact of Drug Control on Public Health: The Global Crisis of 
Avoidable Pain, GCDP, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.
org/reports/the-negative-impact-of-drug-control-on-public-health-
the-global-crisis-of-avoidable-pain/ (accessed June 22, 2016).
61 UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, ix. 
62 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016), Increas-
es in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths — United States, 2000–
2014, 64(50), pp. 1378-82.
63 Drug Policy Alliance (2016), 911 Good Samaritan Fatal Over-
dose Prevention Law, DPA: New York, http://www.drugpolicy.
org/911-good-samaritan-fatal-overdose-prevention-law (accessed 
August 04, 2016).
64 Csete, J. & Pearshouse, R. (2007), Dependent on Rights: As-
sessing Treatment of Drug Dependence from a Human Rights 
Perspective, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network: Toronto, 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Depen-
dent-Rights_July07.pdf (accessed September 27, 2016).
65 UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, 101. 
66 World Prison Brief (2016), Brazil country profile, http://www.
prisonstudies.org/country/brazil (accessed August 11, 2016).
67 Szabó, I. (2014), Drug policy in Brazil: A long-overdue dis-
cussion, Transform Drug Policy Foundation http://www.tdpf.org.
uk/blog/drug-policy-brazil-long-overdue-discussion (accessed 17 
June 2016).
68 The National (2014), Thai women pay the price of drugs, 
http://www.thenational.ae/world/southeast-asia/thai-women-pay-
the-price-of-drugs (accessed 17 June 2016).
69 World Prison Brief (2016), Thailand country profile, http://
www.prisonstudies.org/country/thailand (accessed August 11, 
2016).
70 Sawitta Lefevre, A. (2016), “Soaring prison population 
prompts Thailand to re-think ‘lost’ drug war,” Reuters, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-drugs-thailand-prisons-idUKKCN0ZX01X 
(accessed August 05, 2016).
71 Drug Policy Alliance (2016), The Drug War, Mass Incarcera-
tion and Race, DPA: New York, http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/DPA%20Fact%20Sheet_Drug%20War%20Mass%20In-
carceration%20and%20Race_(Feb.%202016).pdf (accessed August 
04, 2016).
72 Penal Reform International (2016), Global Prison Trends 
2015: Drugs and Imprisonment, PRI: London, 2, http://www.
penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PRI-Prisons-global-
trends-report-LR.pdf (accessed June 22, 2016).
73 National Advocates for Pregnant Women (2016), Punish-
ment of Pregnant Women, NAPW: New York, http://www.ad-
vocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/punishment_of_pregnant_
women/ (accessed June 22, 2016). 
74 Home Office (2015), Police powers and procedures England 
and Wales statistics ending 15 March 2015, UK Government, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-pro-
cedures-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2015 (accessed 
June 23, 2016). 
75 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2013), Stop and 
Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fair-
ly?, HMIC, http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/stop-and-search-pow-
ers-20130709.pdf (accessed June 23, 2016). 
76 Home Office, Police powers and procedures.
77 Eastwood et al., The Numbers in Black and White. 
78 The data does not include statistics from the United King-
dom or Luxembourg. 
79 European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Abuse 
(2016), Statistical Bulletin: Drug Law offenses, Offenses By Type, 
EMCDDA: Lisbon, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016 
(accessed 19 June 2016).
80 Penal Reform International (2016), Global Prison Trends 
2015: Drugs and Imprisonment, PRI: London, 2, http://www.
penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PRI-Prisons-global-
trends-report-LR.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016).
81 Chin, G.J. (2002), “Race, The War on Drugs, and the Col-
lateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction,” The Journal of 




83 Bryan, M., Del Bone, E. & Pudney, S. (2013), A Cost Bene-
fit Analysis of Cannabis Legalisation, Institute for Social & Eco-
nomic Research, University of Essex, 92, https://www.iser.essex.
ac.uk/2013/09/15/a-cost-benefit-analysis-of-cannabis-legalisation 
(accessed June 22, 2016). 
84 Payne, J., , M. & Wundersitz, J. (2008), Police Drug Diver-
sion: A Study of Criminal Offending Outcomes. AIC Reports: 
Research and Public Policy Series 97, Australian Institute of 
Criminology: Canberra, 70, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/
current%20series/rpp/81-99/rpp97.html (accessed June 22, 2016).
85 Eastwood, N., et al., A Quiet Revolution, 6. 
86 Ibid.
87 See UN General Assembly, “United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substanc-
es,” 1988, Article 3; Bewley-Taylor, D. & Jelsma, M. (2012), The UN 
Drug Control Conventions: The Limits of Latitude, Series on Leg-
islative Reform of Drug Policies, no. 18, TNI: IDPC, https://www.tni.
org/files/download/dlr18.pdf (accessed June 22, 2016).
88 Eastwood, N., et al., A Quiet Revolution, 7. 
89 UK Home Office (2014), Drugs: International Comparators, 
UK Government, 47, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368489/DrugsInternational-
Comparators.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016). 
90 Sampaio, J. (2016), “It’s Time to Abandon the War on Drugs 
for a Health-Focused Drug Policy,” The Huffington Post, 20 April.
91 See generally Eastwood, N., et al., A Quiet Revolution.
92 Ibid. See section on Colombia.
93 Dooley-Sammuli, M. (2011), Drug Courts Are Not the An-
swer, Open Society Foundations. (https://www.opensocietyfoun-
dations.org/voices/drug-courts-are-not-answer accessed June 23, 
2016).
94 Csete, J. & Tomasini-Joshi, D. (2015), A Well-Intentioned, 
Deeply Flawed Approach to Drug Treatment, Open Society 
Foundations, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/
well-intentioned-deeply-flawed-approach-addiction-treatment (ac-
cessed June 23, 2016).
95 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control, 22. 
96 OAS, The Drug Problem in the Americas, 103. 
97 EMCDDA & SICAD (2014), 2014 National Report (2013 data) 
to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Portugal 
New Developments, Trend, EMCDDA: Lisbon, 11, http://www.
emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/996/2014_NATION-
AL_REPORT.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).
98 Hughes & Stevens, “What can we learn,” 1015. 
99 Ibid. & EMCDDA & SICAD, 2014 National Report, 75. 
100  Hughes, C. & Stevens, A. (2012), “A resounding success of 
a disastrous failure: re-examining the interpretation of evidence 
on the Portuguese decriminalisation of illicit drugs,” Drug and 
Alcohol Review 31: 108. 
101 International Narcotics Control Board (2015), Statement 
of the President of the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), Mr. Werner Sipp, Reconvened fifty-eighth session of 
the CND Special event: A public health approach as a base for 
drugs policy: The Portuguese case, INCB: Vienna, https://www.
incb.org/documents/Speeches/Speeches2015/statement_recon-
vened_CND_side_event_portugal.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).
102 The National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction, 
Annual Report: The Czech Republic Drug Situation 2013, 2, 
http://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/protidrogova-politika/AR_2013_
CZE.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).
103 Hughes, C. & Ritter, A. (2008), Monograph no. 16: A Sum-
mary of Diversion Programs for Drug and Drug Related Offend-
ers in Australia, DPMP Monograph Series, National Drug and 
Alcohol Research Centre: Sydney.
104 Mamber, N. (2006), “Coke and smack at the drugstore: 
harm reductive drug legalization: an alternative to a criminaliza-
tion society,” Cornell Journal of Law and Policy, 15 (3): 619-664.
105 Stevens, A. (2011), Drugs, Crime and Public Health: the po-
litical economy of drug policy, Routledge: Abingdon, 122–123.
106 Shanahan, M., Hughes, C. & McSweeney, T. (in press), Aus-
tralian police diversion for cannabis offenses: Assessing pro-
gram outcomes and cost-effectiveness, National Drug Law En-
forcement Research Fund: Canberra.
107 McLaren, J. & Mattick, R.P. (2007), Cannabis in Australia: 
use, supply, harms, and responses, National Drug and Alcohol 
Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 560.
108 Goncalvesa, R., Lourenc, A. & Nogueira da Silva, S. (2015), 
“A social cost perspective in the wake of the Portuguese strate-
gy for the fight against drugs,” International Journal of Drug Pol-
icy 26, p. 207, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.08.017 
(accessed June 26, 2016).
109 Hughes & Stevens, “What can we learn,” 1008; and see EM-
CDDA & SICAD, 2014 National Report, 110. 
110 Hughes & Stevens, “What can we learn,” 1010.
111 EMCDDA & SICAD, 2014 National Report, 109. 
112 Hughes & Stevens, “What can we learn,” 1010.
40
113 Jamaica Gleaner (2015), Reformed Ganja Law Reaping 
Results, Says Justice Minister, http://jamaica-gleaner.com/arti-
cle/news/20151008/reformed-ganja-law-reaping-results-says-jus-
tice-minister (accessed June 26, 2016).
114  Aldrich, M.R. & Mikuriya, T. (1988), “Savings in California 
Marijuana Law Enforcement Costs Attributable to the Moscone 
Act of 1976: A Summary,” Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 20 (1): 
75-81, http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/1998_999_002/plat-
form/mj_study.html (accessed June 26, 2016).
115 Boecker, K. (2016), “On D.C.’s one-year anniversary with 
legalized marijuana, work remains,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/
wp/2016/02/25/on-d-c-s-one-year-anniversary-with-legalized-mari-
juana-work-remains/ (accessed June 26, 2016).
116 Magson, J. (2014), Drugs, Crime and Decriminalisation: As-
sessing the Impact of Drug Decriminalisation Policies on the 
Efficiency and Integrity of the Criminal Justice System, Winston 
Churchill Fellowship, 27, http://www.wcmt.org.uk/reports/1200_1.
pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).
117 McLaren & Mattick, Cannabis in Australia, 560.
118 Bradford, B., “Unintended Consequences,” in Delsol, R. & 
Shiner, M. (Eds.) (2015), Stop and Search: The Anatomy of a Po-
lice Power, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 116.
119 UNODC (2015), Briefing paper: Decriminalisation of Drug 
Use and Possession for Personal Consumption, http://www.tdpf.
org.uk/sites/default/files/UNODC-decrim-paper.pdf (accessed on 
June 15, 2016).
120 Gallahue, P. & Lines, R. (2015), The Death Penalty for Drug 
Offences: Global Overview 2015, HRI: London, https://www.hri.
global/files/2015/10/07/DeathPenaltyDrugs_Report_2015.pdf (ac-
cessed July 27, 2016).
121 Ibid; and data from Iran Human Rights (2016), Annual Re-
port on the Death Penalty in Iran 2015, http://iranhr.net/media/
files/Rapport_iran_2014-GB-120314-BD.pdf (accessed August 2, 
2016); and Amnesty International (2016), Death Sentences and 
Executions Report 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
act50/3487/2016/en/ (accessed August 2, 2016).
122 Al Jazeera (2016), Indonesia executes four convicted drug 
traffickers, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/reports-indo-
nesia-executes-convicted-drug-traffickers-160728182341683.html 
(accessed September 26, 2016).
123 This table is based largely on the one found in Gallahue & 
Lines, The Death Penalty for Drug Offences. However, Malaysia 
has been re-categorised from a ”high application state” to a 
”low application state” in light of the moratorium it has report-
edly placed on the death penalty for drug offenses. 
124 Ibid., 8.
125 Coomber, R. (2010), “Reconceptualising drug markets and 
drug dealers—the need for change,” Drugs and Alcohol Today, 
10 (1): 10.
126 Benso, V. (2010), “User-dealer, those who have been forgot-
ten by harm-reduction,” SuchtMagazin 34, http://www.talking-
drugs.org/sites/default/files/drug-user-report-benso.pdf (accessed 
June 15, 2016).
127 Coomber, R., “Reconceptualising drug markets,” 10.
128 Coomber, R., Lowther, J. & Moyle, L. (2013), “Crushing a Wal-
nut With a Sledge Hammer? Analysing the Penal Response to So-
cial Supply of Illicit Drugs,” Social and Legal Studies, 22 (4:), p.554.
129 Nicholas, R., (2008), The impact of social networks and not-
for-profit illicit drug dealing on illicit drug markets in Australia, 
National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund: Hobart, 2.
130 The term “user-dealer” can also be used to refer to people 
who deal drugs to fund recreational drug use, though it is more 
commonly utilised to describe those who use drugs problemat-
ically and who deal.
131 Coomber, R. & Moyle, L. (2015), “Earning a Score: An Explo-
ration of the Nature and Roles of Heroin and Crack Cocaine ‘Us-
er-Dealers’”, The British Journal of Criminology, 55 (3): 534-555.
132 Ibid.
133 Fleetwood, J. (2011), “Five Kilos: Penalties and Practice in 
the International Cocaine Trade,” The British Journal of Crimi-
nology, 51 (2): 382 & 389.
134 Fleetwood, J. (2013), “Five myths about drug mules and the 
death penalty,” The Conversation, September 2, 2013, https://
theconversation.com/five-myths-about-drug-mules-and-the-death-
penalty-17706 (accessed June 9, 2016).
135 Fleetwood, J. (2009), Women in the international cocaine 
trade: Gender, choice and agency in context, University of 
Edinburgh, 234, https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/han-
dle/1842/9895/Fleetwood2009.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 
June 17, 2016).
136 Fleetwood, J., Stevens, A., Klein, A. & Dr Chatwin, C. (2011), 
Written Evidence for Draft Sentencing Guidelines: Drugs and 
Burglary, UK Justice Committee, http://www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmjust/1211/1211we05.htm (ac-
cessed on June 9, 2016).
137 Ibid.
138 Green, P. cited in Fleetwood, “Five Kilos,” 380.
139 Ibid., 381.
140 Fleetwood, Five Kilos,” 377.
41
References
141 At the time of writing, four programs were in the final stages 
of development, while 13 were being developed. A further 15 
were being explored. See http://www.leadbureau.org/ for more 
information. 
142 The threshold does not apply to cannabis or prescription 
pills. See Collins, S.E., Lonczak, H.S. & Clifasefi, S.L. (2016), 
LEAD Program Evaluation: The Impact of LEAD on Housing, 
Employment and Income/Benefits, University of Washington, 
Harborview Medical Center, http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/stat-
ic/f/1185392/27047605/1464389327667/housing_employment_eval-
uation_final.PDF?token=bcMH1VTfG6JVitrbfDvlcPlr%2F84%3D 
(accessed June 23, 2016).
143 Drug Policy Alliance (2016), Law Enforcement Assisted Di-
version (LEAD): Reducing the Role of Criminalization in Local 
Drug Control, 2, http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
DPA%20Fact%20sheet_Law%20Enforcement%20Assisted%20
Diversion%20%28LEAD%29%20_%28Feb.%202016%29.pdf (ac-
cessed June 23, 2016).
144 Collins, S.E., Lonczak, H.S. & Clifasefi, S.L. (2015), LEAD 
Program Evaluation: Recidivism Report, University of Wash-
ington, Harborview Medical Center, 2, http://static1.1.sqspcdn.
com/static/f/1185392/26121870/1428513375150/LEAD_EVALU-
ATION_4-7-15.pdf?token=OGsa4Px6%2F4kRcyXU3mPqgSrLU-
8o%3D (accessed June 23, 2016).
145 Collins, S.E., Lonczak, H.S. & Clifasefi, S.L. (2015), LEAD 
Program Evaluation: Criminal Justice and Legal System Uti-
lization Associated Costs, University of Washington, Har-




6tiOKfhLcY%3D (accessed June 23, 2016).
146 Collins, Lonczak, & Clifasefi, LEAD Program Evaluation: The 
Impact of LEAD on Housing.




150 Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (2004), A failing 
grade: Burma’s drug eradication Efforts, iv, www.altsean.org/
Docs/PDF%20Format/Special%20Reports/Failing%20Grade.pdf 
(accessed June 20, 2016).
151 Camacho, A. & Mejía, D. (2014) “Consecuencias de la as-
persión aérea en la salud: evidencia desde el caso colombiano,” 
in Costos Económicos y Sociales del Conflicto en Colombia: 
¿Cómo construir un posconflicto sostenible? Universidad de los 
Andes: Colombia, 117-138, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7440/j.
ctt1b3t7zx (accessed June 20, 2016).
152 Moloney, A. (date unknown), Displaced in Colombia, Nacla, 
https://nacla.org/article/displaced-colombia (accessed August 2, 
2016).
153 Buxton, J. (2015), Drug Crop Production, Poverty and De-
velopment, OSF: New York, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/drug-crop-production-poverty-and-develop-
ment-20150208.PDF (accessed June 20, 2016).
154 Ibid, 13.
155 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control,.
156 McFarland Sánchez-Moreno, M. (2015), “Winding Down the 
War on Drugs: Reevaluating Global Drug Policy,” Harvard Inter-
national Review 36 (4), http://hir.harvard.edu/winding-down-the-
war-on-drugs-reevaluating-global-drug-policy/ (accessed August 
3, 2016).
157 New Zealand Government (2016), National Statement to 
United Nations General Assembly Special Session on World 
Drug Problem, New York, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/
national-statement-united-nations-general-assembly-special-ses-
sion-world-drug-problem-new-yor (accessed October 03, 2016).
158 United Nations (2009), Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated 
and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, 
UNODC: Vienna, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commis-
sions/CND/Political_Declaration/Political_Declaration_2009/Polit-
ical-Declaration2009_V0984963_E.pdf (accessed June 29, 2016).
159 United Nations (2015), Transforming our world: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN: New York, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7891Trans-
forming%20Our%20World.pdf (accessed June 29, 2016).
160 Tinasti, K., Bém, P., Grover A., Kazatchkine M. & Dreifuss R. 
(2015), “SDGs will not be achieved without drug policy reform,” 
The Lancet, 386 (9999): 1132.
42
GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY
SECRETARIAT
Khalid Tinasti































REPORTS BY  
THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY
• War on Drugs (2011)
• The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS:  
 How the Criminalization of Drug Use Fuels the Global Pandemic (2012)
• The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health:  
 The Hidden Hepatitis C Epidemic (2013)
• Taking Control:  
 Pathways to Drug Policies That Work (2014)
• The Negative Impact of Drug Control on Public Health:  































GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY  
The purpose of the Global Commission on Drug Policy is  
to bring to the international level an informed, science based 
discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce  
the harm caused by drugs to people and societies.
GOALS
• Review the base assumptions, effectiveness and  
consequences of the ‘war on drugs’ approach
• Evaluate the risks and benefits of different  
national responses to the drug problem
• Develop actionable, evidence-based recommendations  
for constructive legal and policy reform
